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UNDERSTANDING CITIZEN PERSPECTIVES ON 
GOVERNMENT DECISION MAKING PROCESSES AS A WAY 
TO IMPROVE THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 
BY 
DAVID L. MARKELL∗ 
This Article explores possible insights from the “procedural 
justice” literature about features of government decision making 
processes that citizens are likely to consider to be particularly valuable 
or important. Numerous commentators have urged that the government 
take steps to increase citizen participation in its decision making 
processes as a way to offset concerns about government legitimacy. 
The premise of the Article is that incorporating into government 
decision making processes features that are important to citizens is a 
potentially helpful step in fostering meaningful citizen participation. 
Processes that citizens value are more likely to be processes that 
citizens use and that enhance citizen confidence in government, while 
processes with features that citizens find unsatisfactory are more likely 
to be processes that do not engender meaningful citizen input; they 
may even operate to undermine citizen confidence. 
This Article reviews a framework that the procedural justice 
literature proposes for assessing citizen satisfaction with decision 
making processes, and it applies this framework to an international 
decision making process that relies heavily on citizen participation, the 
Commission for Environmental Cooperation’s (CEC) citizen 
submissions process. This process, which empowers citizens to file 
complaints in which they claim that any of the North American 
countries is failing to effectively enforce one or more of its 
environmental laws, was created with the hope that it would increase 
government accountability and transparency, and inform and thereby 
improve the exercise of agency discretion. This Article considers the 
track record of the process in light of the procedural justice literature 
in an effort to advance thinking about the design of government  
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decision making processes that are intended to promote meaningful 
public participation. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Agency officials in the contemporary administrative state have 
enormous power to carry out the work of government.1 While the President,2 
Congress,3 and Judiciary4 each has some capacity to serve as an institutional 
check on the actions of agency officials,5 it is widely believed and 
understood that despite these checks agency staff have “staggering 
discretion” in carrying out their responsibilities.6 
 
 1 See, e.g., Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 
HARV. L. REV. 1511, 1512 (1992) (noting that “[o]ver the past century, the powers and 
responsibilities of administrative agencies have grown to an extent that calls into question the 
constitutional legitimacy of the modern federal bureaucracy”); Edward Rubin, The Myth of 
Accountability and the Anti-Administrative Impulse, 103 MICH. L. REV. 2073, 2094 (2005) 
(indicating that administrative agencies “constitute the basic, operational structure of modern 
government”). 
 2 See, e.g., Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245 (2001) 
(discussing the relationship between the executive branch and the administrative state). 
 3 See, e.g., E. Donald Elliott, INS v. Chadha: The Administrative Constitution, the 
Constitution, and the Legislative Veto, 1983 SUP. CT. REV. 125, 150–60 (reviewing mechanisms 
for legislative oversight of agencies); Jack M. Beermann, Congressional Administration, 43 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 61 (2006) (discussing the role of Congress in the administrative state). 
 4 See, e.g., Ronald M. Levin, Understanding Unreviewability in Administrative Law, 74 
MINN. L. REV. 689 (1990) (discussing judicial review of administrative decision making). 
 5 See, e.g., Peter H. Schuck, Delegation and Democracy: Comments on David Schoenbrod, 
20 CARDOZO L. REV. 775, 783–90 (1999) (outlining ways in which agencies are held 
democratically accountable). 
 6 See Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, Auditing Executive Discretion (Stanford Pub. Law & 
Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 116, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=854364 
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The enormous power that unelected agency officials wield, with limited 
oversight, has spawned an extensive literature concerning the legitimacy of 
the administrative state.7 Indeed, Professor Jody Freeman has suggested that 
“[a]dministrative law scholarship has organized itself largely around the 
need to defend the administrative state against accusations of illegitimacy.” 8 
These accusations have focused on a variety of purported flaws, including 
unaccountability of agency officials,9 a lack of transparency in the operation 
of the state,10 limited opportunities for public participation,11 and 
dissatisfaction with agency performance.12 
The question of how institutions build legitimacy is an extraordinarily 
difficult one that remains largely “unanswered.”13 There has been strong 
support for increasing citizens’ opportunities to participate in governance as 
a way to increase government legitimacy and to address some of these 
perceived flaws in the operation of the administrative state. Professor Jim 
Rossi, for example, suggests that “[o]ver the last thirty years or so, courts, 
Congress, and scholars have elevated participation to a sacrosanct status.”14 
 
(discussing administrative discretion); Ashutosh Bhagwat, Three-Branch Monte, 72 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 157, 157–68 (1996) (addressing the reviewability of administrative decisions); 
Levin, supra note 4, at 693–702. 
 7 Seidenfeld, supra note 1, at 1512. For a discussion of institutional legitimacy, see, for 
example, James L. Gibson, et al., The Supreme Court and the US Presidential Election of 2000: 
Wounds, Self-Inflicted or Otherwise?, 33 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 535 (2003). 
 8 Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 546 (2000). 
 9 See RICHARD MULGAN, HOLDING POWER TO ACCOUNT: ACCOUNTABILITY IN MODERN 
DEMOCRACIES 36 (2003) (discussing government accountability); see generally ROBERT D. BEHN, 
RETHINKING DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY (2001) (discussing the evolution of accountability in 
various forms of government). 
 10 Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the Administrative Process, 98 
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 27 (1998) (referring to the “administrative process” as the “proverbial black 
box that mysteriously translates legislative inputs into regulatory outcomes”); ARCHON FUNG, ET 
AL., THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TRANSPARENCY: WHAT MAKES DISCLOSURE POLICIES EFFECTIVE? 6 
(Dec. 2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Ash Institute for Democratic Governance 
and Innovation, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University), available at 
http://www.archonfung.net/papers/FGWEffectiveness.pdf (noting that transparency systems—
systems that require organizations to provide the public with information about their 
practices—have become increasingly popular over the past several years to the point that some 
commentators have referred to them as a “third wave” of regulation). 
 11 See, e.g., Croley, supra note 10, at 97 (discussing how the administrative state does not 
“encourage widespread participation”). 
 12 Commentators have raised an enormous array of other concerns about the administrative 
state such as “capture” of the regulatory process, among others. See, e.g., Michael E. Levine & 
Jennifer L. Forrence, Regulatory Capture, Public Interest, and the Public Agenda: Toward a 
Synthesis, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 167, 169 (1990) (discussing capture theory). 
 13 Gibson, supra note 7, at 556 (2003) (concluding, in a study of the U.S. Supreme Court, that 
“[u]nderstanding how institutions acquire and spend legitimacy remains one of the most 
important unanswered questions for those interested in the power and influence of judicial 
institutions”); James L. Gibson, On the Legitimacy of National High Courts, AM. POL. SCI. REV., 
June 1998, at 343, 344 (noting that the “most important question in legitimacy research [is] how 
institutions acquire and sustain legitimacy.”) 
 14 Jim Rossi, Participation Run Amok: The Costs of Mass Participation for Deliberative 
Agency Decisionmaking, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 173, 174–75 (1997). The same trend towards 
increased citizen involvement exists at the international level. For example, in the 
environmental arena, the 1992 Rio Declaration’s Principle 10 provides that “[e]nvironmental 
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He notes that “recent reform efforts are consistently geared to enhance 
broad-based participation in the agency decision making process.”15 Dean 
Edward Rubin similarly has observed that “[p]articipatory democracy is a 
very fashionable idea these days.”16 Proponents suggest that greater 
opportunities for public involvement in agency decision making processes 
may help to enhance accountability and transparency in governance, 
contribute to more informed, and thereby improved, results,17 and foster a 
greater degree of connection between the governed and the governing (and a 
blurring of the line between the two) that leads to greater social capital and 
societal trust.18 
This Article explores the design of governance mechanisms that are 
intended to incorporate meaningful citizen involvement as a strategy to 
enhance legitimacy.19 It does so by focusing attention on what is a central, 
 
issues are best handled with the participation of all concerned citizens at the relevant level” and 
that “[s]tates shall facilitate and encourage public awareness and participation by making 
information widely available . . . .” Rio Declaration on Environment and Development Princ. 10, 
3, June 14, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 874. 
 15 Rossi, supra note 14, at 175. 
 16 Rubin, supra note 1, at 2104. While interest in public participation may be on the rise, 
commitment to open government and active civic engagement in governance has deep roots in 
the United States. See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC 
CONSTITUTION 3 (2005). Breyer writes: 
The United States is a nation built upon principles of liberty. That liberty means not only 
freedom from government coercion but also the freedom to participate in the 
government itself. [Jefferson, Adams, and the Founders] invoked an idea of freedom as 
old as antiquity, the freedom of the individual citizen to participate in the government 
and thereby to share with others the right to make or to control the nation’s public acts. 
Id. 
 17 STEPHEN MACEDO ET AL., DEMOCRACY AT RISK: HOW POLITICAL CHOICES UNDERMINE CITIZEN 
PARTICIPATION AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT 4 (2005); THE ACCESS INITIATIVE—UNITED STATES, 
AT THE FRONTLINES OF DEMOCRACY: STRENGTHENING THE PUBLIC VOICE IN STATE ENVIRONMENTAL 
AFFAIRS 1 (June 2004), available at http://www.accessinitiative.org/pdf/TAIUS_final.pdf 
(characterizing including the public in decision making as a “core principle of democracy”). 
 18 Societal trust in government is reported to have dropped significantly in recent years. 
See, e.g., WHAT IS IT ABOUT GOVERNMENT THAT AMERICANS DISLIKE? (John R. Hibbing & Elizabeth 
Theiss-Morse, eds., 2001) [hereinafter WHAT IS IT ABOUT GOVERNMENT]; Frank B. Cross, Law and 
Trust, 93 GEO. L.J. 1457, 1457–60 (2005) (observing that law and mechanisms of governance can 
serve as a tool to enhance trust or social capital, or, as a source for further disaffection—“[t]he 
nature of the law seems central to societal trust”); MACEDO, supra note 17, at 4 (arguing that 
“improving our institutions to promote robust citizen engagement is essential to American 
democracy”); Stephanos Bibas, Transparency and Participation in Criminal Procedure, 81 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 41–42 (2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ 
id=869407.  Secrecy impairs trust in the legitimacy of the law and  
[a]t one time, public jury trials not only educated ordinary citizens and let them see and 
influence justice being done, but also contributed to the law’s democratic legitimacy. But 
today, outsiders neither see nor understand nor participate much in criminal justice. The 
system is too opaque and remote to educate them well. . . . This secrecy and opacity 
weakens citizens’ trust in the law and may also make them feel distant and alienated. 
Id. 
 19 There have been several efforts to recast citizens’ roles in governance in this way. See, 
e.g., IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE 
DEREGULATION DEBATE 54–100 (1992) (proposing “tripartism”—empowering public interest 
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threshold question: what is it that citizens like (and dislike) about 
government decision making processes (particularly administrative agency 
decision making processes) that purport to value citizen involvement?20 A 
potentially valuable step in fostering citizen participation in government 
decision making processes is to incorporate in these processes features that 
are important to citizens.21 Processes that citizens value are likely to be 
processes that citizens use and that enhance citizen confidence in 
government, while processes with features that citizens find unsatisfactory 
are likely to be processes that do not engender meaningful citizen input; they 
may even operate to undermine citizen confidence.22 
This Article explores ways in which the “procedural justice” literature 
on citizen satisfaction makes it possible to shed some light on this question 
of citizen preferences in government decision making processes—i.e., to 
develop some insights about the types of features citizens think are most 
valuable or important in decision making processes that incorporate a role 
for them.23 The procedural justice literature provides a conceptual 
 
groups in the regulatory process—as a means to address regulatory capture and corruption); 
Mark Seidenfeld & Janna Satz Nugent, “The Friendship of the People”: Citizen Participation in 
Environmental Enforcement, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 269, 303–15 (2005) (discussing tripartism, 
collaborative governance, and deliberative participation as possible ways to involve citizens in 
the regulatory process); Freeman, supra note 8 (proposing a collaborative state); cf. Mark 
Seidenfeld, Empowering Stakeholders: Limits on Collaboration as the Basis for Flexible 
Regulation, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 411 (2000) (voicing skepticism about same). The 
administrative state is by no means monolithic and opportunities for public involvement vary 
widely depending on the function involved (e.g., adjudication, rulemaking, or something else) 
and, therefore, ideas for reform need to address these contextual realities. See, e.g., ASIMOW ET 
AL., STATE AND FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 645 (2d ed. 1998). 
 20 The general topic of public attitudes toward government is receiving increasing interest. 
See WHAT IS IT ABOUT GOVERNMENT, supra note 18, at 2. 
 21 This Article does not suggest that any particular level of citizen participation is 
appropriate. There is a vast literature on the benefits and costs of citizen engagement in 
governance. See, e.g., Rossi, supra note 14, at 182–88 (summarizing the common justifications 
for “mass participation” in agency decision making); Steve Charnovitz, Two Centuries of 
Participation: NGOs and International Governance, 18 MICH. J. INT’L L. 183, 274–75 (1997) 
(listing 10 potential benefits—and three commonly raised concerns—of empowering NGOs to 
participate in governance). Obviously, as discussed in more detail below, a wide variety of 
factors others than citizen satisfaction with decision making processes may affect levels of 
citizen participation. See, e.g., infra notes 116, 143, 153. 
 22 Bibas, supra note 18, at 40–41.  Noting that: 
[P]eople respect the law more when it is visibly fair and they have some voice or control 
over its procedures. Procedural fairness, process control, and trust in insider’s motives 
contribute greatly to [government’s] legitimacy. [Similarly], [w]hen citizens see that the 
law reaches substantively just outcomes, the law earns moral credibility . . . [while] 
[c]onversely, when the law reaches outcomes that are substantively unjust, or at least 
not visibly just, citizens view the law’s judgments as less credible and less worthy of 
respect. 
Id. While Professor Bibas’s focus was on criminal procedure, his analysis applies to government 
decision making processes more generally. 
 23 I make this effort fully in agreement with Professor Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar’s insight 
that we still have much to learn about both actual and potential public participation in 
regulatory policy. Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, Rethinking Regulatory Democracy, 57 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 411, 417 (2005) (noting that “both . . . are complicated phenomena, full of subtleties, and 
656 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW [Vol. 36:651 
framework for considering citizen satisfaction with opportunities for 
involvement in agency decision making. This literature offers a framework 
for structuring decision making processes in order to engender citizen 
satisfaction by identifying features of government decision making 
processes that are likely to be of particular salience to citizens.24 
After reviewing a basic framework that the procedural justice literature 
proposes for assessing citizen satisfaction with decision making processes, I 
apply this framework to a decision making process that relies heavily on 
citizen participation, the Commission for Environmental Cooperation’s 
(CEC) citizen submissions process. This process, which empowers citizens 
to file complaints in which they claim that any of the North American 
countries is failing to effectively enforce one or more of its environmental 
laws, was created with the hope that it would increase government 
accountability and transparency, that it would inform the exercise of agency 
discretion, and that it would bolster government effectiveness. As Part III 
reflects, there is considerable evidence that the process is floundering (or at 
least not flourishing), at least in the United States. I consider this 
performance (the track record of the process) in light of the procedural 
justice literature in order to explore why this may be the case, and what 
might be done to improve citizen perceptions of the process. The premise, as 
noted above, is intuitively quite straightforward: understanding the features 
that citizens like (and dislike) in decision making processes is a potentially 
important step in structuring decision making processes that are intended to 
enhance the quality of governance by incorporating meaningful citizen 
involvement.25 
 
still only partially understood more than a century into the history of the regulatory state”). 
 24 Use of the procedural justice literature for a conceptual framework needs to be qualified, 
for a variety of reasons. First, as is discussed infra Part III, this literature is by no means fully 
developed or mature. Second, another part of the “justice” literature, which I leave for another 
day, considers how different outcomes of decision making processes affect the level of citizen 
satisfaction (the issue of “distributive justice”). Third, a range of social scientists are interested 
in this issue of citizen satisfaction, from a variety of perspectives. See generally WHAT IS IT 
ABOUT GOVERNMENT, supra note 18; James L. Gibson, et al., The Supreme Court and the US 
Presidential Election of 2000: Wounds, Self-Inflicted or Otherwise?, 33 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 535, 
539–45, 553 (2003), available at http://www.artsci.wustl.edu/~polisci/gibson/bjps2003.pdf 
(discussing the possible relevance of factors such as “institutional loyalty” and “legitimizing 
symbols”). These perspectives deserve consideration as part of any effort to enhance the 
legitimacy of government decision making processes. Finally, a variety of factors may have 
more effect than “procedural justice” in determining levels of citizen participation (such as 
citizen expertise and resources, among others). See supra note 21; see also infra note 153. 
 25 Enhanced understanding of citizen preferences is only one such step in the effort to 
enhance governance. I am not suggesting that citizen preferences should control the design of 
governance institutions. The question of how much of a role citizens should play—how citizens’ 
perspectives and preferences should be balanced against other concerns—is for another time. 
See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE REGULATORY 
STATE 14–15 (1990) (discussing Madison’s concerns about the “usurpation of government power 
by well-organized groups with interests adverse to those of the public as a whole”). In recent 
years, as NGOs have gained entrée into previously closed arenas, several commentators have 
identified a variety of issues that are relevant in considering this issue, including the issue of 
NGO accountability. Ann Florini, for example, has noted that many NGOs do not act in the 
broader “public interest” and, moreover, effectively are unaccountable to society: 
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Parts II and III of this Article provide contextual information about the 
CEC. Part II provides an overview of the CEC including a brief history, a 
summary of the purposes of the CEC citizen submissions process, and an 
overview of the actual operation of the process. Part III reviews the track 
record of the CEC citizen submissions process with a particular focus on 
patterns of citizens’ use of the process. A key finding discussed in Part III is 
that citizens’ use of the process in the United States has slowed dramatically. 
Part IV reviews the procedural justice literature on citizen satisfaction 
with decision making processes. This literature suggests that citizens’ 
assessments of the fairness of third-party decision making procedures is 
important to judgments about the legitimacy of such processes, independent 
of the outcomes of such procedures, a result that some have characterized 
as “counterintuitive.” The procedural justice literature provides a framework 
for considering the extent to which citizens are likely to judge particular 
processes to be fair or just. 
Part V contains an assessment of the citizen submissions process in the 
context of the procedural justice literature, the track record of the CEC 
process, and commentary about the process. This Part identifies various 
features of the process that seem potentially to raise procedural justice 
concerns. Part VI reinforces the potential value of empirically-based 
research for the design and evaluation of processes of governance and 
suggests additional research that will advance understanding of processes 
that are intended to incorporate meaningful citizen involvement. The yield 
from this effort, hopefully, will be to encourage greater consideration of 
empirical work in the design and implementation of institutions of 
governance,26 and, ultimately, to motivate creation of government decision 
 
“[T]here is nothing inherent in the nature of civil society that ensures representation of a 
broad public interest. The neo-Nazi hate groups that exchange repugnant rhetoric over 
the Internet are just as much transnational civil society networks as are the human rights 
coalitions. . . . [C]ivil society can seem disruptive, narrow-minded, and above all 
unaccountable.”  
ANN M. FLORINI, THE THIRD FORCE: THE RISE OF TRANSNATIONAL CIVIL SOCIETY 231–32 (2000). 
Florini notes that “to date, most NGOs have remained relatively immune to the growing 
pressure for transparency on the part of governments and the private sector. . . . [T]o leave the 
issue unaddressed is to threaten the long-term legitimacy of an important contributor to global 
governance.” Id. at 233. Paul Posner identifies five generic problems that relate to 
accountability challenges with third party tools, including goal diversion. Paul L. Posner, 
Accountability Challenges of Third-Party Government, in THE TOOLS OF GOVERNMENT: A GUIDE 
TO THE NEW GOVERNANCE 523, 528–32 (Lester M. Salamon ed., 2002). Professor Ariel Armony 
explores the “dark side” of civil society, and its potential to undermine democracy. See ARIEL  C. 
ARMONY, THE DUBIOUS LINK: CIVIC ENGAGEMENT AND DEMOCRATIZATION 4 (2004). Armony argues, 
inter alia, that: 
“[C]ivil society does not necessarily promote the public interest or reforms that are 
beneficial for the majority. . . . Smaller groups of participants with ample resources and 
privileged access to decision-making spheres can impose narrow and parochial interests 
on the public agenda and, as a result, impose unreasonable burdens on the broader 
society.” 
Id. 
 26 I am currently working with Professor Tom Tyler on a substantial follow-up project 
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making processes that embody the lessons learned from such work and 
hopefully prove more effective than current approaches in enhancing citizen 
confidence in governance. 
II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE COMMISSION FOR ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION AND ITS 
CITIZEN SUBMISSIONS PROCESS27 
A. An Overview of the CEC 
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) Environmental 
Side Agreement, the North American Agreement on Environmental 
Cooperation (NAAEC),28 emerged from the NAFTA negotiations among the 
three North American countries, Canada, Mexico, and the United States, to 
liberalize trade throughout the continent.29 While proponents of NAFTA 
touted it as the “‘greenest’ trade agreement ever,”30 skeptics and other 
opponents were dubious.31 Some participants in the NAFTA debate pushed 
 
involving several processes that are intended to encourage citizen participation. 
 27 I have previously written about the CEC and its citizen submissions process, and some of 
the discussion in this section and in Part V is taken from that earlier work, particularly David L. 
Markell, The Commission for Environmental Cooperation’s Citizen Submission Process, 12 GEO. 
INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 545 (2000), David L. Markell, Governance of International Institutions: A 
Review of the North American Commission for Environmental Cooperation’s Citizen 
Submissions Process, 30 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 759 (2005) [hereinafter Governance of 
International Institutions], and David L. Markell, The CEC Citizen Submissions Process: On or 
Off Course, in GREENING NAFTA: THE NORTH AMERICAN COMMISSION FOR ENVIRONMENTAL 
COOPERATION, at 256 (David L. Markell & John H. Knox eds., 2003) [hereinafter GREENING 
NAFTA]. 
 28 North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, U.S.-Can.-Mex., art. 8–19, 
Sept. 14, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1480 (1994) [hereinafter NAAEC]. 
 29 North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 107 Stat. 2057 
[hereinafter NAFTA]. For book length treatments of the CEC, including discussion of its origins, 
see, for example, PIERRE-MARC JOHNSON & ANDRÉ BEAULIEU, THE ENVIRONMENT AND NAFTA: 
UNDERSTANDING AND IMPLEMENTING THE NEW CONTINENTAL LAW (1996); GREENING NAFTA, supra 
note 27. For analyses the CEC itself developed or commissioned, see, for example, TEN-YEAR 
REV. & ASSESSMENT COMM., TEN YEARS OF NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION 
(2004), available at http://www.cec.org/files/PDF/PUBLICATIONS/TRAC-Report2004_en.pdf 
[hereinafter TRAC]; ENVTL. L. INST., FINAL REPORT: ISSUES RELATED TO ARTICLES 14 AND 15 OF THE 
NORTH AMERICAN AGREEMENT ON ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION (2003), available at 
http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/JPAC/ELI-Art14-15-Report-Final-5_en.pdf [hereinafter ISSUES 
RELATED]; JOINT PUB. ADVISORY COMM., LESSONS LEARNED: CITIZEN SUBMISSIONS UNDER ARTICLES 
14 AND 15 OF THE NORTH AMERICAN AGREEMENT ON ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION, FINAL REPORT 
TO THE COUNCIL OF THE COMMISSION FOR ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION (2001), available at 
http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/JPAC/rep11-e-final_EN.PDF [hereinafter LESSONS LEARNED]; 
INDEPENDENT REV. COMM., FOUR-YEAR REVIEW OF NORTH AMERICAN AGREEMENT ON 
ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION: REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT REVIEW COMMITTEE (1998), 
available at http://www.cec.org/pubs_info_resources/law_treat_agree/cfp3.cfm?varlan=english 
[hereinafter FOUR-YEAR REVIEW]. 
 30 Daniel C. Esty & Damien Geradin, Market Access, Competitiveness, and Harmonization: 
Environmental Protection in Regional Trade Agreements, 21 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 265, 318 
(1997) (quoting former EPA Administrator William Reilly). See also JOHNSON & BEAULIEU, supra 
note 29, at 121 (stating that NAFTA is “more attentive to environment-related concerns than are 
most if not all the preceding trade agreements”). 
 31 Steve Charnovitz, The North American Free Trade Agreement: Green Law or Green Spin?, 
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for creation of an “environmental side agreement” that would create an 
environmental commission that would focus on strengthening North 
American environmental governance and protecting the North American 
environment.32 There was considerable jockeying about the need for such an 
institution and about its possible shape and powers.33 Ultimately, these 
negotiations produced sufficient support for NAFTA to allow its passage, 
accompanied by adoption of an “Environmental Side Agreement,” the 
NAAEC.34 
The NAAEC created a new international institution, the CEC. The CEC 
has been termed a “brave experiment in institution-building.”35 Among other 
things, the CEC: 1) is the “first of its kind in the world in linking 
environmental cooperation with trade relations”,36 2) has “innovative tools 
and almost unlimited jurisdiction” 37 to address “almost any environmental 
issue anywhere in North America”,38 and 3) “provides unprecedented 
opportunities for participation by civil society at the international level.”39 
The CEC has three players: 1) a Council, comprised of the 
environmental ministers of the three parties, 2) a Secretariat, essentially the 
Commission’s staff, located primarily in Montreal, and 3) an innovative 
independent advisory committee made up of five citizens from each of the 
countries, known as the Joint Public Advisory Committee (JPAC).40 With the 
important exception of the citizen submissions process, described below,41 
and under some circumstances the article 13 process, the Council is 
responsible for setting the agenda for the Commission.42 The Council 
 
26 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 1, 68 (1994) (challenging the notion that NAFTA is the “greenest” free 
trade agreement ever). 
 32 See Kal Raustiala, The Political Implications of the Enforcement Provisions of the NAFTA 
Environmental Side Agreement: The CEC as a Model for Future Accords, 25 ENVTL. L. 31, 33–34 
(1995) (stating that the CEC was the result of pressure from environmental groups who 
recognized the ecological threat created by liberalized trade); TRAC, supra note 29, at 42 
(noting that “the NAAEC was negotiated out of a concern that a Party’s lack of enforcement of 
its environmental laws might provide it with an unfair competitive advantage”). The decision to 
create an environmental side agreement split the environmental community. Some NGOs were 
persuaded not to oppose the NAFTA package because of the inclusion of the environmental 
agreement, while others continued to oppose NAFTA. See Joseph F. DiMento & Pamela M. 
Doughman, Soft Teeth in the Back of the Mouth: The NAFTA Environmental Side Agreement 
Implemented, 10 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 651, 675–81 (1998) [hereinafter Soft Teeth]. 
 33 See DiMento & Doughman, supra note 32, at 667–74 (detailing the negotiations and 
eventual agreement on the structure and functions of the CEC). 
 34 A labor agreement was adopted as well. North American Agreement on Labor 
Cooperation, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Sept. 14, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1499 (1993) [hereinafter NAALC]. 
 35 TRAC, supra note 29, at 4. 
 36 Id. at ix. 
 37 GREENING NAFTA, supra note 27, at 2. 
 38 TRAC, supra note 29, at ix. 
 39 GREENING NAFTA, supra note 27, at 2. 
 40 NAAEC, supra note 28, art. 8–19. See John D. Wirth, Perspectives on The Joint Public 
Advisory Committee, in GREENING NAFTA, supra note 27, at 199, 199 (highlighting the broad 
mandate and substantial achievements of the JPAC). 
 41 See infra Part II. 
 42 NAAEC, supra note 28, art. 10(1). The Secretariat also has some discretion under Article 
13 of the NAAEC. Id. art. 13. For an assessment of one Secretariat article 13 report, see Dan 
Tarlock & John E. Thorson, Coordinating Land and Water Use in the San Pedro River Basin, in 
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approves the annual work plan for the Commission and oversees the work 
done to implement the work plan.43 The Secretariat develops the draft work 
plan for Council approval44 and takes the lead on implementation of the 
work plan.45 The JPAC is unique in making representatives of civil society 
part of the governance structure of the CEC; it puts them on the inside.46 The 
JPAC is authorized to provide advice to the Council on any matter within the 
scope of the NAAEC and takes an active role in soliciting input on key issues 
from interested North American stakeholders. 47 
The CEC’s reach, and potential importance, transcends its NAFTA roots 
and trade/environment origins. As John Knox and I have suggested 
elsewhere, it represents an experiment in regional environmental 
governance and should be of considerable interest to those interested in 
cooperative efforts on environmental issues: 
[T]he NAAEC and the CEC are much more than window dressing for NAFTA. 
The NAAEC establishes the first regional environmental organization in North 
America and gives it interesting, innovative mandates; it addresses 
environmental issues related to economic integration in more detail than any 
other agreement outside the European Union; and it provides new 
opportunities for direct public participation in its implementation. In all of 
these respects, the NAAEC offers lessons for other countries seeking to 
address shared environmental problems against a backdrop of increasing 
economic integration – which is to say, all countries.48 
Moreover, given the increasing emphasis on “spotlighting” instruments, 49 
 
GREENING NAFTA, supra note 27, at 217–36. 
 43 NAAEC, supra note 28, art. 10(1). 
 44 Id. art. 11(6). 
 45 See id. art. 11 (describing the Secretariat’s structure and procedures for carrying out its 
technical, administrative, and operational support duties). 
 46 See id. art. 16; Janine Feretti, Innovations in Managing Globalization: Lessons from the 
North American Experience, 15 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 367, 370 (2003) (discussing the JPAC’s 
creation as signaling the parties’ “commitment to public participation” and as an example of the 
parties’ building the public’s role “into the structure of the Commission . . .”). 
 47 NAAEC, supra note 28, art. 16(4); see Joint Pub. Advisory Comm., N. Am. Comm’n for 
Envtl. Cooperation, Vision Statement, http://www.cec.org/who_we_are/jpac/vision/ (last visited 
July 16, 2006) (“Our vision is to . . . ensure active public participation . . . in the actions of the 
commission.”); Joint Pub. Advisory Comm., N. Am. Comm’n for Envtl. Cooperation, Assuring 
Public Participation 1 (2003), available at http://www.cec.org/files/PDF/JPAC/ 
FactSheet_EN%20fin.pdf (“Since 1994, the Committee has made several calls for public 
comment on specific topics and has made important advice to Council and Secretariat, 
contributing to the CEC’s work.”). 
 48 John H. Knox & David L. Markell, The Innovative North American Commission for 
Environmental Cooperation, in GREENING NAFTA, supra note 27, at 9, 13. 
 49 Cass R. Sunstein, Informational Regulation and Informational Standing: Akins and 
Beyond, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 613, 618–26 (1999) (discussing “informational regulation,” that is, 
regulation intended to promote effective implementation through relatively “soft,” non-coercive 
approaches, rather than through conventional “command-and-control” strategies.) See generally 
CLIFFORD RECHTSCHAFFEN & DAVID L. MARKELL, REINVENTING ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT & 
THE STATE/FEDERAL RELATIONSHIP 59–83, 213–67 (2003) (discussing different strategies for 
promoting environmental compliance). 
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citizen participation in governance,50 and accountability mechanisms (and 
government performance),51 the particular part of the CEC that is the focus 
of this Article, its citizen submissions process, deserves particular attention 
because it is an example of a spotlighting mechanism intended to facilitate 
such participation and accountability (and improved performance).52 A 2004 
report on the first ten years of the CEC’s operations concluded that “[t]he 
CEC has successfully promoted citizen engagement on environmental issues 
and increased government accountability regarding the enforcement of 
environmental laws.”53 It suggests that the NAAEC “stands out for its 
provisions for public participation and for the unprecedented commitment 
by the three governments to account internationally for the enforcement of 
their environmental laws.”54 It continues: “[t]hese provisions make the CEC 
an international model for providing new avenues of public participation for 
civil society.”55 The following section describes this innovative citizen 
submissions process in more detail. 
B. The CEC Citizen Submissions Process 
The CEC’s JPAC has highlighted the importance of the CEC citizen 
submissions process as a possible model for enhancing public oversight of 
government enforcement efforts: 
In preparing this Report, we have been conscious of the importance of the 
Articles 14 and 15 submission process as a vehicle for public oversight of the 
enforcement of environmental laws by the Parties to the [NAFTA] and as a 
possible model for similar efforts under other trade agreements within the 
Americas and the world.56 
A variety of commentators have echoed this sentiment. As one commentator 
has suggested, “[t]he Citizen’s Submission Process [is] perhaps the most 
important function of the Secretariat of the CEC, and definitely the one that 
has captured the most attention of environmental groups, the private sector, 
 
 50 See infra Part IV.A. 
 51 See, e.g., David Markell, “Slack” in the Administrative State and Its Implications for 
Governance: The Issue of Accountability, 84 OR. L. REV. 1 (2005). 
 52 The Environmental Law Institute (ELI) has characterized the process as “[b]y far the 
most innovative and substantial mechanism created within the NAAEC for fostering 
transparency and public participation.” ISSUES RELATED, supra note 29, at 4. 
 53 TRAC, supra note 29, at x. 
 54 Id. at 4. 
 55 Id. See infra Part III. 
 56 LESSONS LEARNED, supra note 29, at 2. The Environmental Law Institute (ELI) has 
characterized the process as “[b]y far the most innovative and substantial mechanism created 
within the NAAEC for fostering transparency and public participation.” ISSUES RELATED, supra 
note 29, at 4; see also TRAC, supra note 29, at 42, 43 (“One of the key mechanisms the NAAEC 
created to meets its objective of enhancing compliance with, and enforcement of, 
environmental laws and regulations is the citizen submission process . . . . This mechanism is 
the NAAEC’s most innovative and most controversial.”). The TRAC report also quotes a JPAC 
Advice that the process plays a “unique and indispensable role in fostering vigorous 
environmental enforcement,” and a NAC Advice that it is a “cornerstone of the [NAAEC].” Id. 
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and legal specialists . . . in NAEEC’s article 14 and 15.”57 Chris Wold, the 
principal author of the one U.S. submission to result in a CEC factual 
record,58 notes that “[m]any had regarded the Citizen Submission Process as 
a potential model for accountability and governance for a new breed of 
international institutions—a positive response to globalization that gives 
citizens a voice in the often impenetrable affairs of international 
organizations.”59 
The hope was that this citizen spotlighting mechanism would invigorate 
the domestic environmental enforcement practices of Canada, Mexico, and 
the United States, which would lead to improved compliance and higher 
levels of environmental protection.60 In short, the process was intended to 
be an important feature of the countries’ efforts to bolster domestic 
governance capacity in response to concerns that the liberalized trade made 
possible by NAFTA would increase pressures on domestic governments 
because of “race to the bottom,” scale, and other possible effects of 
expanding trade.61 
 
 57 Beatriz Bugeda, Is NAFTA up to its Green Expectations? Effective Law Enforcement 
Under the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, 32 U. RICH. L. REV. 1591, 
1596 (1999). 
 58 Chris Wold, et al., The Inadequacy of the Citizen Submission Process of Articles 14 & 15 
of the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, 26 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. 
REV. 415, 416 (2004). 
 59 Id. Wold also noted that “[c]itizens had strongly supported the Citizen Submission 
Process and played an active role in supporting and employing the mechanism.” Id. at 416. See 
also Randy Christensen, The Citizen Submission Process Under NAFTA: Observations after 10 
Years, 14 J. ENVTL. L. & PRAC. 165 (2004) (noting that the citizen submission process has been an 
effective means of “highlighting environmental problems, compelling governments to engage in 
debates, and bringing about positive environmental change through independent factual 
investigations”). Mr. Christensen, a lawyer with the Canadian Sierra Legal Defense Fund 
(SLDF), probably has as much experience with the CEC process as any U.S. or Canadian NGO, 
having served as legal counsel on three submissions that have proceeded to factual records. Id. 
at 166 n.1. There were clearly some skeptics as well and, indeed, significant elements of the 
environmental community continued to oppose NAFTA despite the commitment to create the 
NAAEC and establish the CEC. See, e.g., Mary E. Kelly, NAFTA’s Environmental Side 
Agreement: A Review and Analysis, (Tex. Ctr. for Pol’y Stud., Austin, Tex.), 1993, at (pt. 2), 
available at http://www.ciesin.org/docs/008-099/008-099ii.html (suggesting that “the non-binding, 
virtually advisory role of most CEC reports and recommendations [undermine] the value of 
having such a broad scope of issues come under the CEC”). 
 60 David L. Markell, The Citizen Spotlight Process, ENVTL. F., Mar.–Apr. 2001, at 33; see John 
H. Knox, A New Approach to Compliance with International Environmental Law: The 
Submissions Procedure of the NAFTA Environmental Commission, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 23 (2001) 
(noting that “Mexico’s environmental laws were essentially equivalent to those of the United 
States and . . . the problem was inadequate compliance with those laws.” As a result, the United 
States and other NGOs that were the driving forces behind the creation of the CEC and its 
citizen submission mechanism, sought a mechanism that would focus on bolstering domestic 
enforcement capacity. While the objective was to bolster such capacity across the continent, 
there was particular interest in a mechanism that would invigorate Mexican enforcement.). In 
its June 1998 report, the Independent Review Committee (IRC) suggests that the process 
“feed[s] into the Council’s responsibility to promote high environmental standards and their 
enforcement, and to prevent a race to the bottom from occurring.” FOUR-YEAR REVIEW, supra 
note 29, at 8. In the IRC’s view, the process provides “some 350 million pairs of eyes to alert the 
Council of any ‘race to the bottom’ through lax environmental enforcement.” Id. at 17. 
 61 See Greg M. Block, The North American Commission for Environmental Cooperation and 
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There are three main actors in the citizen submissions process: the CEC 
Council;62 interested citizens (“civil society”);63 and a Secretariat.64 In 
creating the process, the parties assigned a substantial role to citizens of the 
three North American countries. The NAAEC empowers citizens to start the 
spotlighting process and, thereby, influence where the spotlight will shine 
(the process is launched with the filing of a citizen complaint called a 
submission).65 In addition, the NAAEC empowers citizens to contribute 
information about the nature and effectiveness of the government 
enforcement practices at issue in particular submissions.66 
The NAAEC vests in the CEC Secretariat considerable authority over 
administration of the process. Under the NAAEC’s division of 
responsibilities, it is the Secretariat’s job to conduct the initial review of a 
submission and decide, based on a variety of factors contained in NAAEC 
article 14(1) and (2), whether to reject the submission or to ask the targeted 
country for a response.67 Article 14(2)(b), for example, directs the 
Secretariat to consider whether the submission “raises matters whose 
further study in [the citizen submissions] process would advance the goals 
of this Agreement.”68 If the Secretariat determines that a submission does 
not warrant further review, based on the Secretariat’s consideration of the 
submission in light of the article 14(1) and (2) factors, the Secretariat may 
unilaterally dismiss the submission.69 
For submissions that survive the Secretariat’s article 14(1) and (2) 
filtering process, it is the Secretariat’s responsibility both to request a 
response from the party whose enforcement efforts are the focus of the 
submission, and to review the submission in light of any such response.70 
The Secretariat then determines whether to notify the Council that, in the 
Secretariat’s view, it would be appropriate under the NAAEC to prepare a 
 
the Environmental Effects of NAFTA: A Decade of Lessons Learned and Where They Leave Us, 
26 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 445, 451 (2004) (examining the effects of trade liberalization 
on environmental expenditures); Kal Raustiala, Police Patrols & Fire Alarms in the NAAEC, 26 
LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 389, 395 (2004) (noting that “[m]any environmentalists believe 
that trade liberalization undermines environmental protection not only in terms of a race to the 
bottom in regulatory standards, but also in a race-to-the-bottom in implementation and 
enforcement”). 
 62 NAAEC, supra note 28, arts. 8–19. 
 63 Id. 
 64 NAAEC, supra note 28, arts. 11–15. The TRAC Report characterizes the Secretariat as 
“unique among intergovernmental organizations in the combination of its traditional service 
role to the governments that created it with responsibilities where the Secretariat has certain 
autonomy (Articles 13 to 15).” TRAC, supra note 29, at 32. A former CEC Executive Director has 
stated that there is a “significant natural tension between the Secretariat and the parties” 
because of the independent authority of the Secretariat. Feretti, supra note 46, at 369. The Joint 
Public Advisory Committee (JPAC) has also played in important role in the citizen submissions 
process. See Wirth, supra note 40, at 199 (discussing the JPAC’s role in the CEC). 
 65 NAAEC, supra note 28, art. 14. 
 66 Id. art. 15. 
 67 Id. art. 14. 
 68 Id. art. 14(2)(b). 
 69 See infra notes 200–02 and accompanying text (discussing the Secretariat’s track record 
in performing this responsibility). 
 70 NAAEC, supra note 28, arts. 14(2), 15(1). 
664 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW [Vol. 36:651 
“factual record.”71 The Secretariat may unilaterally dismiss a submission at 
this stage if it determines that a factual record is not warranted. 72 In either 
case—a recommendation to proceed with a factual record or a dismissal—
the Secretariat must explain the rationale for its decision.73 
If the Council directs the Secretariat to go forward with the 
development of a factual record, the Secretariat has the opportunity and 
responsibility to develop information relating to the allegations in the 
submission of a failure to effectively enforce and then to prepare a draft 
factual record that contains the results of its investigative work. Article 
15(4) of the Agreement authorizes the Secretariat to consider “any relevant 
technical, scientific or other information” that is: 1) “publicly available”, 2) 
“submitted by interested non-governmental organizations or persons”, 3) 
submitted by the JPAC, or 4) “developed by the Secretariat or by 
independent experts.”74 The Agreement also specifies that the Secretariat 
shall consider any information provided by a party.75 Another provision in 
the NAAEC, article 21, gives the Secretariat authority to obtain information 
from the parties,76 and article 11(4) forbids unilateral party efforts to 
influence the Secretariat in the performance of its responsibilities.77 Thus, 
the Agreement appears to give the Secretariat broad discretion to obtain 
information about the enforcement practices that are the focus of the 
submission, including hiring experts to assist it and requesting information 
from the country involved. 
Finally, after developing a draft factual record and submitting it to the 
Council for comments,78 the Secretariat has discretion to develop a final 
factual record, incorporating any party comments only to the extent the 
Secretariat deems appropriate.79 
While the NAAEC gives considerable authority to citizen submitters 
(including the power to trigger the process and thereby to determine on 
what enforcement practices the spotlighting mechanism will shine), and to 
the Secretariat to administer the process, it is also clear that, in creating the 
CEC, the parties vested considerable power in the Council, reflecting their 
intention to retain an important role in the implementation of the citizen 
 
 71 Id. art. 15(1). Factual records are the endpoint of the citizen submission process and 
provide information about the nature of the party’s enforcement practices at issue and about 
the effectiveness of those enforcement practices. 
 72 Id. Council Res. 99-06, at 9.6, C.E.C. Doc. C/99-00/RES/07/Rev.3 (June 28, 1999), 
http://www.cec.org/citizen/guide_submit/index.cfm?varlan=english (last visited July 16, 2006) 
[hereinafter Guidelines for Submissions] (“If the Secretariat considers that the submission, in 
light of any response provide by the Party, does not warrant development of a factual 
record, . . . the submission process is terminated with respect to that submission.”). The NAAEC 
requires the Secretariat to terminate a submission that focuses on a matter that is the subject of 
a pending judicial or administrative proceeding. NAAEC, supra note 28, art. 14(3)(a). 
 73 NAAEC, supra note 28, art. 15(1) (recommendation to proceed with a factual record); 
Guidelines for Submissions, supra note 72, at 9.6. 
 74 NAAEC, supra note 28, art. 15(4). 
 75 Id. 
 76 Id. art. 21. 
 77 Id. art. 11(4). 
 78 Id. art. 15. 
 79 Id. art. 15(5)–(6). 
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submissions process.80 As suggested above, the process creates specific 
“checks” that the Council may exercise at particular stages in the citizen 
submissions process. Thus, the NAAEC gives the Council a “check” on 
submissions for which the Secretariat believes development of a factual 
record is warranted. Instead of allowing the Secretariat unilaterally to 
determine to proceed with the preparation of a factual record, the parties 
reserve in the Council authority to terminate a submission at this stage.81 
The NAAEC requires that the Secretariat recommend preparation of a 
factual record to the Council and it empowers the Council to decide, after it 
reviews the Secretariat’s Recommendation, whether to dismiss the 
submission or direct the Secretariat to prepare a factual record.82 
The process creates two additional party “checks” on the Secretariat’s 
authority, both following the Secretariat’s preparation of a draft factual 
record. First, the NAAEC requires that the Secretariat submit draft factual 
records to the Council, and it authorizes each party to provide comments to 
the Secretariat on the draft (important limitations on these party “checks” 
are that parties’ comments must be confined to the “accuracy” of the draft, 
and the Secretariat need only take such comments into account, when the 
Secretariat deems appropriate, but it is not obligated to incorporate them).83 
The parties’ other “check” is that the Council retains control over public 
release of final factual records.84 The Secretariat must submit each final 
factual record to the Council, and it is up to the Council to determine 
whether to release it to the public.85 
III. THE TRACK RECORD OF CITIZENS’ USE OF THE CEC CITIZEN SUBMISSIONS 
PROCESS 
As noted above, citizens initiate the citizen submissions process by 
filing a “submission” in which they allege that a party is failing to effectively 
enforce one or more of its environmental laws.86 This is potentially an 
important, indeed unique, opportunity for citizens to direct a spotlight onto 
government enforcement practices that citizens believe are inadequate.87 
The track record of citizens’ use of the process is likely to be a helpful signal 
of the process’s prospects for success. A “spotlighting” mechanism that is 
not being used is likely not as effective as it might be. In contrast, 
substantial, and increasing, use of the process would be a strong (though, 
obviously not dispositive) signal of a vibrant, successful mechanism. Thus, 
the extent of citizens’ use of a citizen-driven spotlighting process such as the 
 
 80 See Markell, Governance of International Institutions, supra note 27, at 769–80. 
 81 NAAEC, supra note 28, art. 15(2). (“The Secretariat shall prepare a factual record if the 
Council, by a two-thirds vote, instructs it to do so.”) (emphasis added). The parties structured 
the process to prevent the Party that is the focus of the submission from unilaterally 
terminating the process by allowing Council approvals by majority vote, rather than by 
consensus. 
 82 Id. 
 83 Id. art. 15(5)–15(6). 
 84 Id. 
 85 Id. 
 86 NAAEC, supra note 28, art. 14. 
 87 LESSONS LEARNED, supra note 29, at 2. 
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citizen submissions process is a potentially useful benchmark for assessing 
its possible utility or value.88 This Part reviews the track record of citizen use 
of the process. 
A. Overall Use of the Process 
In its 2001 Lessons Learned: Citizen Submissions Under Articles 14 and 
15, JPAC puts a positive gloss on the extent of citizens’ use of the citizen 
submissions process.89 It notes that “[c]itizen [s]ubmissions [p]lay an 
[e]ssential [r]ole in [a]chieving the [g]oals of the NAAEC. . . . NGOs from the 
NAAEC countries have repeatedly turned to the articles 14 and 15 process 
when they believed that domestic environmental remedies were not 
adequate to address their complaints.”90 On the other hand, some 
commentators have been less impressed with the level of citizen use of the 
process.91 
Figure 1 provides a comprehensive review of use of the citizen 
submissions process. It shows that, as of December 31, 2005, citizens have 
filed a total of fifty-two submissions since inception of the CEC in 1994. 
Figure 1. Citizen Submissions Process: Annual Submissions (Through 
December 31, 2005)92 
 
 88 There are other signals or indicators of success or failure as well. Some are intrinsic to 
the process, such as the significance of the practices that are spotlighted. Others are extrinsic, 
such as the need for the mechanism in light of the alternatives, the level of concern about 
government enforcement, resources, other priorities, and the like. See infra Part IV. 
 89 LESSONS LEARNED, supra note 29, at 13–14. 
 90 Id. at 10, 13 (noting that the Secretariat needs additional resources to administer the 
process because of the workload). 
 91 See Kal Raustiala, Citizen Submissions and Treaty Review in the NAAEC, in GREENING 
NAFTA, supra note 27, at 256–57; TRAC, supra note 29, at 43 (indicating that the CEC has 
“received far fewer submissions than initially anticipated”). 
 92 Figure 1 was developed using data released by the Secretariat. COMM’N FOR ENVTL. 
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Submissions work out to 4.33 per year over this 12-year period. If one 
were to start the clock from the beginning of 1995, the year in which the first 
submission was filed, the average is 4.7 submissions per year (52 divided by 
11). Thus, regardless of whether one begins counting submissions at the 
time the citizen submissions process was first available for business, or 
whether one waits a year to give the process a chance to become better 
known, the total of fifty-two submissions translates into between four or five 
submissions per year. 
The other feature of this record that seems to be potentially relevant to 
use is the question of trends in use over time. Has the process experienced a 
significant increase or decrease in its use since its inception? A significant 
increase seemingly would suggest a vital process that is perceived to be 
useful. A significant decrease seemingly would portend a process that is not 
perceived to have sufficient promise or value to warrant use. 
As Figure 1 reflects, here the record is not particularly clear. During the 
first six years of the process, from 1994–1999, a total of twenty-two 
submissions were filed. During the past six years, a total of thirty 
submissions have been filed. This track record suggests that the process is 
experiencing an increase in use. One qualification, however, is that the 
picture of a trend of increasing submissions is much less clear if one 
discounts the start-up year (1994, when no submissions were filed). That is, 
if one begins with 1995, a total of twenty-eight submissions were filed during 
the initial six year period (from 1995-2000), while twenty-four have been 
filed during the more recent five year period. As a result, unless there are an 
unprecedented number of submissions in 2006, the distribution of 
submissions between the first and second six year periods is likely to be 
relatively equal. In short, viewed on its own, the track record appears to 
reflect a pattern of relatively stable use, with moderate ebbs and flows 
annually, rather than a significant increase or decrease in use over time. 
In addition to reviewing the track record of the CEC process on its own, 
it also may be helpful to evaluate this record by comparing it with other 
citizen-driven mechanisms. There are two citizen-driven processes under the 
suite of NAFTA Agreements besides the CEC citizen submissions process: 
the citizen submissions mechanism created under the Labor Side 
Agreement,93 and the investor provision created under NAFTA itself.94 These 
would seem to be natural points of possible comparison for the CEC 
process, although the processes are by no means identical and other salient 
differences may exist as well. 
The Labor Side Agreement, like the NAAEC, allows NGOs to file 
petitions. Under the NAALC, the petitions are filed with National 
Administrative Offices (NAO), bodies that are set up as agencies within the 
 
COOPERATION, ARTICLE 14 SUBMISSION ON ENFORCEMENT MATTERS: PROCESS STATUS AS OF 27 
JANUARY 2006 (2006) (on file with author). The Secretariat develops these status updates 
periodically and makes them available to the public. As a general matter, I am especially 
indebted to Damian Zimmerman, J.D. expected 2007, Florida State University College of Law, 
for his work in development of the tables and figures in this article. 
 93 NAALC, supra note 34 arts. 27–41. 
 94 NAFTA, supra note 29, ch. 11. 
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labor department of each member state.95 In other words, they are not 
independent of the member governments to which they belong. There have 
been a total of thirty-two submissions since inception of the process in 1994, 
as Figure 2 reflects. 
Figure 2: NAALC Labor Agreement Annual NAO Submissions (Through 
December 31, 2005) 96 
 
These figures suggest at least two salient facts in terms of the Labor 
process’s relevance as a possible point of comparison for the CEC citizen 
submissions process. First, the environmental citizen submissions process 
has experienced much more use than the Labor Agreement process: only 
61.5% as many submissions have been filed under the latter as under the 
former. Further, the Labor Agreement statistics reflect a significant decline 
in use over the past several years. During the first six years of its operation, 
a total of twenty-two submissions were filed, while only ten have been filed 
during the past six years. Thus, two-thirds of the submissions were filed 
during the first six years, and only one-third over the past five. In short, in 
terms of total use and trends in use, the CEC process appears to be much 
more vibrant than does the Labor Agreement process.97 
 
 95 See NAALC, supra note 34, art. 15 (requiring each party to treaty to establish National 
Administrative Office at the federal government level); Jonathan Graubart, “Politicizing” a New 
Breed of “Legalized” Transnational Political Opportunity Structures: Labor Activists Uses of 
NAFTA’s Citizen-Petition Mechanism, 26 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 97, 99 (2005) (noting that 
while the NAOs can accept petitions, they “cannot order changes in state or company behavior 
nor issue sanctions”). 
 96 Figure 2 was developed using data released by the U.S. Department of Labor. U.S. Dep’t 
of Labor, Status of Submissions Under the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation 
(NAALC), http://www.dol.gov/ILAB/programs/nao/status.htm (last visited July 16, 2006). 
 97 Another key point concerning the labor process involves the spike in use in 1998. During 
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Chapter 11 of NAFTA98 includes a variety of provisions that are 
intended to protect foreign direct investment, by North American investors, 
in other North American countries. It establishes that, for instance, 
government measures should not discriminate between foreign and 
domestic investors;99 it is intended to assure a “minimum standard” of “fair 
and equitable” treatment for foreign investors,100 and it limits expropriation 
or any measure “tantamount to nationalization or expropriation.”101 
Investors are empowered to seek relief through binding international 
arbitration.102 Investors have filed a total of twenty-seven cases under 
chapter 11 since NAFTA entered into force in 1994, as Figure 3 reflects. 
Figure 3: NAFTA Chapter 11: Annual Submissions (Through December 
31, 2005)103 
 
that year ten submissions were filed, while no more than four have been filed any other year. 
Professor Graubart recently has suggested that “some past petitioners [are] ready to write off 
the [NAALC] process altogether.” Graubart, supra note 95, at 98. He suggests that “[s]hifts in the 
broader political context affect the value” of mechanisms like the NAALC, and that the 
reduction in perceived value of the NAALC process is attributable to a less supportive U.S. 
Administration, and a Mexican President who is less vulnerable to shaming campaigns. Id. at 
101. He concludes that a “deteriorating political climate guts the political value of quasi-judicial, 
nonbinding mechanisms.” Id. at 121. Graubart suggests, however, that the process has “proven 
its political worth” through the changes it has engendered, and that the NAALC is “likely to 
regain value when political circumstances turn favorable again.” Id. at 101, 140. 
 98 NAFTA, supra note 29 at 639–49. 
 99 Id. at 639. 
 100 Id. 
 101 Id. at 640. 
 102 Id. at 643; see Sanford E. Gaines, Protecting Investors, Protecting the Environment: The 
Unexpected Story of NAFTA Chapter 11, in GREENING NAFTA, supra note 27, at 173, 174–77 
(providing an overview of Chapter 11 of NAFTA). 
 103 Figure 3 was developed using data released by the U.S. Department of State. U.S. Dep’t of 
State, NAFTA Investor-State Arbitrations, http://www.state.gov/s/l/c3439.htm (last visited July 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
1994
(0)
1995
(0)
1996
(0) 
1997
(3)
1998
(3)
1999
(4)
2000
(2)
2001
(2)
2002
(5)
 2003
(3)
2004
(3)
2005
(2)
Year
N
um
be
r 
of
 S
ub
m
is
si
on
s
670 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW [Vol. 36:651 
In terms of the possible salience of the NAFTA chapter 11 experience 
for assessing the track record of the CEC citizen submissions process, over 
the same period of time the CEC process has received much more citizen 
use than has the NAFTA chapter 11 process. The latter has experienced 52% 
or a little more than half as many submissions. The figure reflects that after 
the first three years (during which no petitions were filed), use has been 
relatively stable.104 
 
16, 2006). The data reflect the number of NAFTA chapter 11 investor-state disputes submitted 
for arbitration from 1994 through December 31, 2005. The Waste Management, Inc. v. United 
Mexican States claim filed in 1998, first rejected by a tribunal on procedural grounds and then 
later refiled, is treated as one claim. Similarly, the more than 100 claims listed as Cases 
Regarding the Border Closing due to BSE Concerns are treated as one claim. 
 104 NAFTA Investor-State Arbitrations, supra note 103. Other citizen-driven mechanisms 
were created by international institutions at about the same time as the NAAEC citizen 
submissions process was established. The World Bank’s inspection panel, created in 1993, 
allows people directly and adversely affected by a proposed bank project to claim that the Bank 
failed to follow its own operational policies and procedures during the design, appraisal, and/or 
implementation of a Bank-financed project . Since 1993, the World Bank Inspection Panel has 
received a total of 34 requests, or about two-thirds as many as the number of CEC submissions. 
There has been a significant decline in submissions to the Inspection Panel over the second half 
of its existence. While there were 20 submissions during the first six years (from 1994–1999), 
there have only been 14 over the past six years (2000–2005). See Daniel D. Bradlow, Private 
Complaints and International Organizations: A Comparative Study of the Independent 
Inspection Mechanisms in International Financial Institutions, 36 GEO. J. INT’L L. 403, 411–20 
(2005) (discussing the World Bank Inspection Panel). Significant differences in the mechanisms 
may account for these differences in track record, such as their jurisdictional scope, and 
standing to bring a claim. The World Bank Inspection Panel, Res. No. 93-10, World Bank (Sept. 
22, 1993), reprinted in World Bank Inspection Panel, Operating Procedures Annex 1 (1994), 
available at http://web.worldbank.org/ (follow “index” hyperlink; then follow “Inspection Panel” 
hyperlink; then follow “Policies and Procedures” hyperlink; then follow “Operating Procedure – 
English”). Several other international financial institutions have established inspection 
mechanisms since the Bank did so in 1993. Bradlow, supra, at 409. Further, the European Union 
created the European Ombudsman in the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 to investigate complaints of 
maladministration in the European Union governing bodies. Any citizen of the Union or any 
natural or legal person residing or having its registered office in a member state can lodge a 
complaint with the Ombudsman. Use of this process has been significantly greater than use of 
any of the NAFTA-created processes, including the CEC process and also significantly greater 
than use of the World Bank’s Inspection Panel, and use has increased dramatically since 
inception of the process. See Bradlow, supra, at 449–53 (discussing the European Ombudsman). 
The citizen submissions process created in the 1997 Canada-Chile Agreement on Environmental 
Cooperation provides another basis for comparison. This process has received only four 
submissions to date, none since 2002. None of the submissions resulted in a factual record. 
Canadian Nat’l Secretariat, Canada-Chile Agreement on Envtl. Cooperation Submissions 
Registry, http://www.can-chil.gc.ca/English/Profile/JSC/Registry/Registry.cfm (last visited July 
16, 2006). 
In addition, domestic mechanisms exist as well. In the United States, for example, citizens 
have a broad range of potential mechanisms for raising concerns about performance, including 
citizen suits under statutory law against violators, citizen suits against government agencies for 
not performing non-discretionary acts, common law actions, and the opportunity to participate 
in various ways in government enforcement and permitting actions. Professor Jim May reports 
that the trend is toward more citizen suit activity, indicating that since 1995, citizens have filed 
about one lawsuit each week and submitted more than 4,500 notices of intent to sue, which 
translates to about two notices of intent to sue each business day. James R. May, Now More 
Than Ever: Trends in Environmental Citizen Suits at 30, 10 WIDENER L. REV. 1, 4 (2003). Use of 
this domestic mechanism obviously dwarfs use of the CEC process over the past decade. 
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What insights, if any, should we glean from the CEC’s track record, 
when viewed independently, and relative to other citizen-driven mechanisms 
created around the same time? While comparative analysis of different 
institutions with different structures, powers, and constituencies should 
obviously be done with considerable caution,105 such an analysis shows that 
overall use of the CEC process (between four and five submissions per year) 
is not out of line with the other NAFTA citizen-driven institutions. If 
anything, there has been greater recourse to the CEC mechanism than to the 
others. 
Trends in use of the CEC mechanism are not particularly clear. There 
has been an ebb and flow in use of the CEC process, but there has not been 
a significant increase or decrease in overall use, if one compares the early 
years of the process and the more recent period. The CEC process, again, 
does not seem to be following the trend lines of the NAALC process; instead, 
its track record in terms of use is more similar to that of the NAFTA chapter 
11 process. It is unclear, at this point, how use of the CEC process will 
evolve over time, including whether the CEC process is experiencing a long 
gestation period before it “takes off,” or whether use will remain relatively 
stable or decline in the future.106 
B. A More Nuanced Review of the CEC Track Record 
A more detailed analysis of the track record of citizens’ use of the CEC 
process tells a potentially different story than the seemingly unsettled 
picture one might glean from the numbers reviewed in the preceding 
section. In particular, a look at the number of submissions disaggregated 
based on the country targeted reveals trends in use that suggest that citizens 
have not embraced the process as a viable mechanism for raising concerns 
about U.S. enforcement; indeed, for the past few years they seem to have 
virtually abandoned it for this purpose. 
Table 1 provides a more detailed breakdown of citizen submissions 
than Figure 1 above, by reviewing the distribution of submissions by country 
involved. It shows that, overall, of the fifty-two total submissions, nine have 
involved the United States, seventeen have involved Canada, and twenty-six 
have involved Mexico. 
 
 105 See John H. Knox, Separated at Birth: The North American Agreements on Labor and the 
Environment, 26 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 359, 379 (2004). 
 106 In his review of the track records of the NAAEC and NAALC processes, John Knox 
concludes that the CEC procedure is more effective, in part because citizens have continued to 
use it. He “urg[ed] labor and environmental advocates to recognize the relative success of the 
NAAEC and [to] work to build on its provisions.” Id. at 360. 
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Table 1: Distribution of Submissions by Country (Through December 
31, 2005) 107 
 
On the one hand, it is not necessarily surprising that Mexico would be 
the target of more submissions than Canada or the United States. One 
reason the NAAEC focuses on environmental enforcement, and includes a 
mechanism that focuses on enforcement failures, is that there was concern 
that Mexican enforcement was inadequate, and that international scrutiny 
might be a useful strategy to bolster it.108 Thus, some might suggest that the 
distribution of filings reflects that the process is working as intended. In 
other words, the process originally was created in part because of concerns 
about Mexican enforcement, so it is consistent with that original conception 
for submissions to disproportionately target Mexico. 
Beyond differences in the enforcement performance of the respective 
domestic governments, there also may be good reasons for this disparity. 
For example, significant differences in the availability of domestic tools for 
citizens to challenge government performance and/or to take action on their 
own to address inadequate enforcement may well be important factors 
underlying the disparity in submissions across countries.109 
 
 107 Table 1 was developed using data released by the Secretariat. COMM’N FOR ENVTL. 
COOPERATION, supra note 92. 
 108 See, e.g., Knox, supra note 60, at 23. 
 109 See, e.g., Raustiala, Police Patrols & Fire Alarms, supra note 61, at 412 (stating that “the 
disparity in citizen submissions probably reflects the existence of better alternatives in U.S. 
domestic law”); Christensen, supra note 59, at 171 (stating that a “common explanation given 
for the low usage of the citizen submission process in the United States is the wide availability 
of domestic enforcement mechanisms”); Randy E. Brogdon & Mack McGuffey, Recent Trends in 
CAA Citizen Suits: Managing Risk in the Serengeti, 20 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 17, 17–21 
(Winter 2006) (offering reasons why domestic citizen suits in the United States under the Clean 
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On the other hand, the disparity is arguably significant given the 
populations of each country—the United States, which has by far the fewest 
submissions, has by far the largest population, estimated at 297,914,453.110 In 
comparison, as of July, 2006, Canada’s estimated population is 33,098,932,111 
and Mexico’s estimated population is 107,449,525.112 As Professor Kal 
Raustiala has pointed out, “[o]n a per capita basis, complaints against 
Canada are more than 1400% higher and complaints against Mexico more 
than 700% higher than complaints against the United States. The United 
States, with nearly ten times the population of Canada, has fewer 
submissions filed against it than Canada has even in absolute terms.”113 
The more significant finding concerning the track record of citizen use 
of the citizen submissions process relates to trends in use, rather than to the 
overall use of the process depicted above. In particular, there has been a 
significant change in use of the process in recent years in terms of the 
countries citizens are targeting. Table 2 reviews use of the process during its 
first six years, roughly the first half of its existence. There were a total of 
twenty-eight submissions during this period, a little more than half of the 
fifty-two filed to date. Table 2 shows that the distribution of submissions by 
country during this initial six year period was relatively uniform or balanced. 
Of the twenty-eight submissions, eight were filed against the United States 
(29%), nine were filed against Canada (32%), and eleven were filed against 
Mexico (39%). 
 
Air Act and domestic common law actions may be increasingly popular). 
 110 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. POPULATION CLOCK FOR JAN. 16, 2006, http://factfinder. 
census.gov/home/saff/main.html?_lang=en (last visited July 16, 2006). 
 111 CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK, CANADA, http://www.cia.gov/ 
cia/publications/factbook/geos/ca.html#People (last visited July 16, 2006) (reporting the most 
current Canadian census information). 
 112 CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK, MEXICO, http://www.cia.gov/cia/ 
publications/factbook/geos/mx.html#People (last visited July 16, 2006) (reporting the most 
current Mexican census information). 
 113 Raustiala, supra note 61, at 412. 
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Table 2: Distribution of Submissions by Country 1994-2000 (Total 
Submissions 1994-2000)114 
 
Table 3 shows that the distribution of submissions has changed 
dramatically during the most recent five year period, from 2001-2005. Table 3 
reflects that of the twenty-four submissions filed during this period; only one 
has involved the United States (4%). Eight submissions have involved 
Canada (33%), while Mexico is the target of fifteen of the last twenty-four 
submissions (62.5%). In short, submissions involving the United States have 
effectively dried up. 
 
 114 Table 2 was developed using data released by the Secretariat. COMM’N FOR ENVTL. 
COOPERATION, supra note 92. 
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Table 3: Distribution of Submissions by Country 2001-2005 (Total 
Submissions 2001-2005)115 
 
This precipitous decline in U.S. submissions raises a host of issues. For 
purposes of this Article, the question is whether implementation of the 
process has led to citizen dissatisfaction for reasons suggested by the 
procedural justice literature, which in turn has caused citizens virtually to 
abandon the process for the United States.116 And, the obvious follow-up 
question: to the extent that implementation of the process has been 
unsatisfactory to citizens (and this may have led to a decision to limit use of 
the process to challenge U.S. enforcement), is it possible to identify features 
of the process that have been particularly problematic and to develop fixes 
that will ameliorate concerns? 117 
There is some evidence that U.S. submitters (and prospective 
submitters) have been frustrated with implementation of the process, in 
terms of submissions challenging U.S. enforcement. Jay Tuchton, an early 
 
 115 Table 3 was developed using data released by the Secretariat. COMM’N FOR ENVTL. 
COOPERATION, supra note 92. The totals above reflect the name of the member country listed as 
the “Party Concerned” in each submission. 
 116 The distribution of submissions also raises questions concerning whether outcome-based 
factors or factors independent of the process are contributing to changes in distribution of use, 
including, for example, changes in priorities after September 11th or other developments, 
availability of reduced resources, availability of domestic mechanisms, greater comfort with 
government enforcement (unlikely in my view), or heightened skepticism concerning the 
efficacy of “shaming” mechanisms in the current political climate. See Graubart, supra note 95, 
at 137–40 (discussing the changes in the political climate and subsequent shifts in the NAALC 
petition process). 
 117 A concern has been raised that the distribution of submissions raises geopolitical issues 
concerning the possible effect of this trend on Mexico’s commitment to the process if the trend 
continues. If the trend continues, Mexico’s commitment to the process might become an issue. 
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U.S. submitter who challenged U.S. practices, for example, criticized the 
process because of what he believed to be the Secretariat’s overly narrow 
interpretation of the scope of the process, which he suggested substantially 
reduced its value.118 There is considerable anecdotal evidence that Council 
actions in overseeing and implementing the process have triggered 
significant citizen dissatisfaction. The 2004 TRAC Report, for example, has 
the following to say about the impact of Council actions on U.S. NGO 
support for the CEC: 
[T]he CEC has less support than could have been anticipated among its major 
stakeholder groups (NGOs, business, academia) in the United States for a 
variety of reasons. The interest of US NGOs has declined. . . . US NGO 
dissatisfaction with what they see as the Council weakening the citizens’ 
submission process . . . has contributed to this detachment.119 
Part V provides a more detailed review of citizen satisfaction 
concerning implementation of the process. First, though, this Article lays the 
groundwork for considering this question by reviewing the psychology 
literature on satisfaction in order to provide a tentative framework for 
considering citizen perspectives. 
 
 118 Jay Tuchton, The Citizen Petition Process Under NAFTA’s Environmental Side 
Agreement: It’s Easy to Use, but Does it Work?, 26 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,031, 10,031 (1996). Most 
other commentators have given the Secretariat high marks for its decisions concerning these 
submissions. See infra notes 211–17 and accompanying text. A related point is that the lack of 
submissions involving U.S. practices does not mean that U.S. NGOs have abandoned the 
process. Of the 24 submissions filed since 2000, a few that focus on Canadian or Mexican 
enforcement include U.S. individuals and/or NGOs as co-submitters. See, e.g., Ontario Power 
Generation (SEM-03-001), C.E.C. Doc. A14/SEM/03-001/22/14(1)(2) (Aug. 14, 2003), 
http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/sem/03-1-DET%2014_1__2__en.pdf (last visited July 16, 2006) 
(discussing Canada’s failure to effectively enforce the Canadian Environmental Protection Act 
and the Federal Fisheries Act against the Ontario Power Generations coal-fired plant); Ontario 
Logging (SEM-02-001), C.E.C. Doc. A14/SEM/02-001/01/SUB (Feb. 4, 2002), http://www.cec.org/ 
files/pdf/sem/03-1-DET%2014_1__2__en.pdf (last visited July 16, 2006) (discussing Canada’s 
alleged failure to effectively enforce subsection 6(a) of the Migratory Birds Regulations against 
the logging industry in Ontario); Montreal Technoparc (SEM-03-005), C.E.C. Doc. A14/SEM/03-
005/12/14(1)(2) (Aug. 14, 2003), http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/sem/03-5-DET14_1_2_en.pdf (last 
visited July 16, 2006) (discussing Canada’s alleged failure to effectively enforce section 36(3) of 
the Fisheries Act in connection to alleged discharges of pollutants into the St. Lawrence River); 
Coronado Islands (SEM-05-002), C.E.C. Doc. A14/SEM/05-002 (May 2, 2005), http://www.cec.org/ 
files/pdf/sem/05-2-SUB_en.pdf (last visited July 16, 2006) (discussing a submission regarding a 
finding that Mexico failed to effectively enforce its environmental law within the meaning of 
NAAEC by allowing the construction of a liquefied natural gas re-gasification terminal adjacent 
to an environmentally sensitive area). 
 119 TRAC, supra note 29, at 40. The TRAC Report continues: “Canadian and Mexican NGOs, 
however, have valued the increased transparency that the citizens’ submission process has 
brought to specific issues in each of these countries.” Id. 
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IV. USING THE LITERATURE ON “PROCEDURAL JUSTICE” AS A POSSIBLE FRAMEWORK 
FOR CONSIDERING THE DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION OF GOVERNMENT DECISION 
MAKING PROCESSES, INCLUDING THE CEC CITIZEN SUBMISSIONS PROCESS 
As discussed above,120 numerous scholars have argued that trust in 
government, and in institutions of governance, is indispensable for the 
continuing legitimacy of the state. The conventional wisdom, unfortunately, 
is that we are operating “against the backdrop of fifty years of declining 
legitimacy for legal and political authorities. People are less willing to trust 
political and legal authorities than in the past.”121 Even if this were not the 
case, it is still worthwhile to understand the extent to which government 
institutions are operating in ways that increase or diminish levels of citizen 
trust or confidence. The purpose of this Part is to explore the beginnings of a 
possible framework for assessing citizen satisfaction with institutions of 
governance, including government decision making processes intended to 
promote meaningful public participation.122 This framework is drawn from 
the social science literature on “procedural justice.”123 
The question of how best to evaluate decision making processes based 
on their “legitimacy” is not an easy one to answer.124 Intuitively, one might 
think that outcomes of decision making processes are the variable most 
likely to influence perceptions of participants and others about the 
legitimacy of such processes. It might be expected, in other words, that 
results will be determinative. To borrow from the psychology literature, 
because the “instrumental orientation of social-psychological models of the 
person . . . view[s] people as wanting to maximize the resources they gain in 
interactions with others,”125 good results will engender increased confidence 
while adverse results will lead to diminished trust. 
The psychology literature, however, suggests a result that some have 
characterized as “counterintuitive,” notably that the extent to which a 
process is “procedurally just” is extremely important to judgments about its 
legitimacy.126 While it may be “difficult to believe that people will find a 
negative or undesirable outcome more acceptable simply because of the 
 
 120 See supra notes 7–18 and accompanying text. 
 121 TOM R. TYLER ET AL., SOCIAL JUSTICE IN A DIVERSE SOCIETY 85 (1997). See also Cross, supra 
note 18, at 1457–60. 
 122 As noted supra, citizen satisfaction is not the only factor that should be considered in 
designing such processes. 
 123 One leading commentator defines “procedural justice” to involve participants’ 
satisfaction with decision making processes. Tom R. Tyler, What is Procedural Justice?: Criteria 
Used by Citizens to Assess the Fairness of Legal Procedures, 22 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 103, 121 
(1988). See also Gerald S. Leventhal, What Should Be Done With Equity Theory? New 
Approaches to the Study of Fairness in Social Relationships, in SOCIAL EXCHANGE: ADVANCES IN 
THEORY AND RESEARCH at 27, 39 (Gerold Mikula ed., 1980) (“[A] justice rule is defined as a belief 
that allocative procedures are fair when they satisfy certain criteria. This type of justice rule is 
referred to as a procedural rule, to distinguish it from distribution rules.”). 
 124 See supra notes 7–18 and accompanying text. 
 125 TYLER, supra note 121, at 76. 
 126 See Tyler, supra note 123, at 108–10 (examining procedural justice in the context of 
citizen experiences with police and courts). 
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manner in which it was arrived,”127 the psychology literature on procedural 
justice suggests that is the case. A key insight from this literature, in short, is 
that legitimacy should not be assessed solely on the basis of the 
distributional implications of decision making processes—i.e., based on the 
fairness or justice of the outcomes different types of processes are likely to 
yield. Instead, outcome favorability and fairness are not identical—citizens 
clearly make distinct fairness judgments—and the extent to which a 
decision making process is “procedurally just” is an important factor in 
assessing the legitimacy of such process.128 As Tom Tyler has put it, “the 
expanded model [of social justice] recognizes that people are concerned 
about how decisions are made as well as about what those decisions 
are”129—the distinction between substantive and procedural justice. 
Evaluations of the fairness of the procedures by which outcomes are 
determined have been labeled “judgments of procedural justice.”130 
Thibaut and Walker undertook the first systematic psychological 
research program to try to demonstrate the importance of procedural justice 
in the 1970s.131 They hypothesized that a person’s evaluation of the fairness 
of decision making procedures influences his reaction to the outcomes of 
those procedures that is distinct from his reaction to the outcomes 
themselves. 132 Their studies demonstrated that people’s assessments of the 
fairness of third-party decision making procedures shape their satisfaction 
with their outcomes.133 Subsequent studies of procedural justice support 
Thibaut and Walker’s pioneering work, finding that participants’ level of 
satisfaction with decision making processes is “influenced by their 
judgments about the fairness” of such processes. 134 Tom Tyler, one of the 
leading commentators in this area, summarizes the literature in a 2000 
article, Social Justice: Outcome and Procedure:135 
Studies of the legitimacy of authority suggest that people decide how legitimate 
authorities are, and how much to defer to those authorities and to their 
 
 127 See TYLER, supra note 121, at 76. 
 128 Tyler, supra note 123, at 117. 
 129 TYLER, supra note 121, at 75. 
 130 Id. at 76. 
 131 See John Thibaut & Laurens Walker, A Theory of Procedure, 66 CAL. L. REV. 541 (1978) 
(proposing a general theory of procedure for resolving conflicts, based on social psychology 
research examining characteristics of various systems in the legal process). 
 132 Id. at 548. 
 133 Id. at 549. 
 134 Tyler, supra note 123, at 103. Tyler went on to state: 
Past studies have consistently found that judgments of the fairness of the procedures 
that occur when citizens deal with legal authorities influence citizen satisfaction and 
evaluation of those authorities. . . . 
. . . . 
The findings . . . strongly support the suggestion of prior research that a key determinant 
of citizen reactions to encounters with legal authorities is the respondents’ assessment 
of the fairness of the procedures used in that contact. 
Id. at 117, 128. 
 135 See generally Tom R. Tyler, Social Justice: Outcome and Procedure, 35 INT’L J. PSYCHOL. 
117 (2000). 
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decisions, primarily by assessing the fairness of their decision-making 
procedures. Hence, using fair decision-making procedures is the key to 
developing, maintaining, and enhancing the legitimacy of rules and authorities 
and gaining voluntary deference to social rules.136 
Tyler suggests that procedural justice may be even more important than 
distributive justice in some contexts in shaping participants’ perspectives 
concerning the fairness of decision making processes, including in contexts 
in which the “right” decision is unclear: 
In many social situations, it is not at all clear what decision or action is correct 
in an objective sense. . . . 
. . . . 
Thibaut & Walker (1978) argue that what is critical to good decision-making in 
outcome-ambiguous situations is adherence to norms of fairness, and fairness 
is most evident when procedures that are accepted as just are used to generate 
the decision.137 
Tyler concludes that “there are important reasons for optimism concerning 
the viability of justice-based strategies for conflict resolution.”138 That is, 
decision making strategies that are “procedurally just” would seem to have 
significant potential to ameliorate citizens’ distrust of government, 
independent of the outcomes of such processes.139 
In short, given government’s interest in increasing its legitimacy with its 
citizens, it seems that government routinely would want to consider the 
“procedural justice” of its decision making processes in order to enhance 
legitimacy to the extent that doing so is consistent with other objectives. 
Given the social science findings described above, the CEC process seems to 
represent a particularly good opportunity for the government to gain 
legitimacy. The area of focus of the process is environmental enforcement, 
an arena in which the right decision is often not clear from an objective 
sense.140 Further, other opportunities for meaningful citizen engagement 
with government officials are limited.141 Thus, if government wants to gain 
legitimacy for its actions in this arena, it would seem to be particularly 
helpful to it to have decision making processes that are fair and perceived as 
such. The CEC process, a highly innovative mechanism that incorporates a 
 
 136 Id. at 120. 
 137 TYLER, supra note 121, at 100. 
 138 Tyler supra note 135, at 124. 
 139 One interesting question that this finding raises involves the extent to which 
“procedurally just” processes may operate as a placebo to dampen citizens’ concerns about 
government decisions that citizens should be concerned about. See Tom R. Tyler & Gregory 
Mitchell, Legitimacy and the Empowerment of Discretionary Legal Authority: The United States 
Supreme Court and Abortion Rights, 43 DUKE L.J. 703 (1994) (questioning the value of 
procedures that create a sense of fairness in cases in which those procedures do not materially 
advance actual justice). 
 140 Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831–32, 837 (1985) (holding that government decisions 
not to enforce generally are not subject to judicial review in part because of the numerous 
factors involved in such decisions). 
 141 Markell, supra note 51, at 44. 
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significant opportunity for public involvement, is one possible model for a  
 
mechanism that, if effective, will enhance legitimacy of and confidence in 
government enforcement practices.142 
Given that government would be well-served by considering the issue of 
“procedural justice” in formulating decision making processes, the next 
question involves whether there are guideposts for evaluating the extent to 
which decision making processes are likely to be “procedurally just.” To 
paraphrase Professor Tyler, assuming an answer in the affirmative to the 
first issue raised—whether procedural justice matters—the analysis then 
turns to the second—the criteria that may be helpful in evaluating the 
fairness of procedures. 
Commentators have tended to focus on three key issues in formulating 
frameworks for assessing the procedural justice of different decision making 
processes: 1) the criteria to be used to evaluate fairness, 2) the weight to be 
given each criterion, and 3) how the criteria are related.143 Further, 
commentators have suggested that the answers to these questions are 
contextual rather than universal; that is, peoples’ perceptions of procedural 
justice “are found to vary depending on the nature of the situation.”144 
Different scholars have posited different criteria for evaluating the 
procedural justice of decision making processes.145 Professor Tyler suggests 
 
 142 On the other hand, even if prospective submitters believe that the process is 
“procedurally just,” they might not have much interest in using it if the end result is not likely to 
be of value to them. Thus, as noted supra note 138 (accompanying quote), in considering the 
procedural justice implications of a mechanism such as the CEC citizen submission process, it 
is also important to keep in mind the possible salience to citizens of the issue of effectiveness 
(outcomes). Suggesting the likely importance of distributive justice to citizen satisfaction, 
Professor Knox concludes that “the utility of a reporting procedure [i.e., the CEC process] 
depends on the value of the reports it produces.” Knox, supra note 105, at 381. It certainly bears 
further research to gauge the extent to which citizens consider the extent to which a process is 
“procedurally just,” as well as the extent to which citizen interest in a process is determined by 
their views concerning the likelihood that the process will give them what they want. As noted 
supra note 7–18, other factors are likely to be relevant to citizens as well, including the 
availability of alternative venues in which to raise their concerns. A great many factors, in short, 
may influence the level of citizen participation, and the extent to which a process is perceived 
to be “procedurally just” may be only one of them. Another issue, not addressed in detail in this 
Article, involves the extent to which the involvement of organized interests should be viewed as 
a surrogate or proxy in assessing adequacy of participation. See, e.g., Cuéllar, supra note 23, at 
429–35 (examining public involvement in the regulatory process). 
 143 Tyler, supra note 123, at 106. 
 144 TYLER, supra note 121, at 92. People’s ratings of the importance of differing criteria vary 
depending on the nature of the situation. These findings suggest there is no universally fair or 
unfair procedure. Id. See also Tyler, supra note 123, at 123–24, 127 (suggesting that under 
differing circumstances citizens judge procedural fairness by different criteria and that 
therefore there are no universally fair procedures for allocation and dispute resolution; different 
procedures are appropriate in different circumstances); Leventhal, supra note 123, at 39–40 
(suggesting that the basic criteria used to evaluate the fairness of procedures change with 
circumstances). 
 145 TYLER, supra note 121, at 87 (describing the different criteria of commentators and 
recognizing that the framework for procedural justice is evolving); Leventhal, supra note 123, at 
39 (suggesting that “[t]he criteria that define the rules of fair procedure can only be guessed at 
this time, because there have been few studies of procedural fairness”). 
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that the following four criteria are likely to be particularly important to 
individuals’ determinations about whether governmental procedures are fair 
or just: 1) the nature of opportunities to participate,146 2) whether the 
authorities are neutral,147 3) the degree to which people trust the motives of 
the authorities,148 4) and whether people are treated with dignity and respect 
during the process.149 
Part III of this Article demonstrates that prospective users of the citizen 
submissions process have reduced their use of the process in recent years to 
challenge the effectiveness of U.S. environmental enforcement efforts. This 
Part provides a theoretical framework for considering possible rationales for 
this decline, notably the possibility that prospective users may be skeptical 
about the procedural justice of the process.150 In the next Part, I review the 
 
 146 Tyler, supra note 135, at 121–22 (noting that, where people may participate in the 
resolution of their disputes or may voice their opinions to decision-makers, they view such a 
procedure as more fair, even when their comments carry little weight in the outcome of the 
conflict). 
 147 See id. at 122 (explaining people’s attribution of fairness to procedures in which the 
authorities follow impartial rules and make decisions based on objective factors, not personal 
feelings. “Basically, people seek a ‘level playing field’ in which no one is unfairly 
disadvantaged.”). 
 148 See id. (describing the importance of trust—based on the authority’s thoughtful 
consideration of the arguments presented and efforts to preserve fairness—in shaping people’s 
views of procedural fairness). 
 149 See id. (pointing to the impact of the general desire to be treated with dignity and respect 
on perceptions of fairness). For other formulations, compare Leventhal, supra note 123, at 39 
(listing six criteria for procedural justice: 1) consistency, 2) the ability to suppress bias, 3) 
decision quality or accuracy, 4) correctability, 5) representation, and 6) ethicality), and Thibaut 
& Walker, supra note 130, at 563–64 (highlighting process control and decision control as two 
primary criteria for evaluating procedural justice). Commentators have noted that some of 
these considerations may trade-off. For an example, see TYLER, supra note 121, at 93–94 (noting 
the trade-off between fairness and non-fairness criteria, such as between providing 
representation—a voice for participants—and efficiency). Professor Tyler provides an example 
in the sentencing context: 
Literature on the psychology of judicial sentencing argues that magistrates can make 
high-quality decisions that particularize punishment to the situation of each individual 
defendant only if they have wide latitude to sentence inconsistently. This argument 
suggests that consistency in sentencing is in conflict with decision quality, 
operationalized in this case by sentences that will effectively rehabilitate criminals. 
 Tyler, supra note 123, at 106–07. 
 150 Outcome-related (“distributive justice”) issues may be a factor as well. See, e.g., supra 
notes 116, 143 and accompanying text. Of course, it is possible that the explanation for the track 
record described in Part II lies in whole or in part in developments external to the process itself. 
It may be, for example, that use has declined because concerns about environmental 
enforcement are less salient than they used to be, that priorities have shifted because of Sept. 
11 or other developments, that resources have diminished, or that alternative domestic 
processes to address NGO concerns have improved. Randy Christensen has commented on the 
availability of domestic mechanisms as a possible reason why a decline in submissions targeting 
the United States has not been accompanied by a similar decline in Canadian or Mexican 
submissions: 
A common explanation given for the low usage of the citizen submission process in the 
U.S. is the wide availability of domestic enforcement mechanisms to pressure the 
government to comply with environmental laws. These mechanisms include avenues 
such as “citizen suit” provisions under federal environmental law statutes that result in 
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workings of the process in the context of this procedural justice framework. 
V. ASSESSMENTS OF THE CEC CITIZEN SUBMISSIONS PROCESS IN LIGHT OF ITS 
TRACK RECORD AND THE PROCEDURAL JUSTICE LITERATURE 
This Part considers insights from the procedural justice literature that 
may be helpful in assessing the CEC citizen submissions process. A central 
insight from this literature is that the views of prospective submitters and 
other interested parties of the citizen submissions process, including the 
value in using it, may be based on procedural justice as well as distributive 
justice considerations.151 As noted in Part IV, there is no consensus 
framework at this point for assessing the extent to which any decision 
making process is likely to be procedurally just.152 In addition, there is a 
recognition that what is procedurally just will vary with the 
circumstances.153 This Article analyzes the citizen submissions process with 
these caveats and qualifications in mind. 
Applying Tyler’s four criteria for assessing the legitimacy of decision 
making processes to the submissions process (opportunities to participate, 
neutrality, trust, and treatment with dignity and respect),154 the short answer 
is that the literature suggests apparent shortcomings in the operation of the 
process from a procedural justice standpoint. Part of the “blame” may lie 
with the structure of the process, while the actions of the governments of 
the three participating countries also appear to be responsible for some of 
the dissatisfaction. As the 2004 TRAC Report puts it with respect to the 
latter, “while they [the parties] publicly embrace the values that underlie the 
process—transparency, accountability, stronger environmental protection—
they have in practice sought to circumscribe it, for reasons not well 
appreciated by outside observers.”155 In other words, while particular 
features of the process may be partially responsible for citizen frustration, 
according to several commentators, the parties’ actions have undermined 
citizen satisfaction with the process in terms of several elements of 
procedural justice that Professor Tyler has identified.156 
 
clear and enforceable results. In Canada and Mexico, there are significantly fewer 
domestic avenues available for achieving similar results. 
Christensen, supra note 59, at 171. Further, domestic expectations may be different as well, 
including different expectations created by the relatively adversarial nature of the U.S. legal 
system, and these differences may partially account for differences in use and in reactions to 
the implementation experience. See, e.g., David L. Markell, The Role of Deterrence-Based 
Enforcement in a “Reinvented” State/Federal Relationship, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (2000) 
(describing the interaction between EPA goals and state implementation). Another possible 
explanation for the decline is that “shifts in the broader political context [may have] affected 
the value” of the CEC mechanism, as Professor Graubart suggests has been the case for the 
NAALC. Graubart, supra note 95, at 101. 
 151 See supra Part III; see also supra note 150. 
 152 See supra Part III. 
 153 See supra Part III. 
 154 See supra Part III. 
 155 TRAC, supra note 29, at 42–43. 
 156 This Article focuses on the first three elements. There are, of course, issues associated 
with the procedural justice of the process that do not stem from the parties’ implementation of 
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A. Opportunities for Meaningful Participation 
The CEC citizen submissions process provides three main opportunities 
for active citizen participation. First, it is citizens who launch the process by 
filing submissions.157 Neither the CEC Secretariat nor the CEC Council may 
initiate an investigation under the CEC citizen submissions process sua 
sponte; the capacity of either to act under the process is predicated on a 
citizen filing a submission that identifies alleged enforcement failures.158 
Thus, the process empowers citizens to decide where to shine the CEC 
spotlight. Common sense suggests that this opportunity to frame the issues 
is an important element under the rubric of opportunities to participate. 
Next, if the CEC Secretariat decides that a submission is inadequate 
and dismisses it, a citizen may refile the submission within thirty days after 
receiving the dismissal.159 Further, there is nothing to stop a citizen from 
filing a new submission if the Secretariat or Council decides not to develop a 
factual record based on a citizen’s initial submission. Thus, citizens are not 
subject to res judicata-type constraints on filing submissions.160 
Finally, if the CEC decides to develop a factual record, the factual 
record process gives interested citizens a chance to submit information to 
the CEC Secretariat. Article 15(4) of the Agreement authorizes the 
Secretariat to consider “any relevant technical, scientific or other 
information” that is “submitted by interested non-governmental 
organizations or persons.”161 Thus, following their initiation of the process, 
citizens may contribute additional information for consideration as part of 
the development of a factual record, if a submission makes it to that point. 
There are also significant limits affecting citizens’ opportunities to 
participate in the CEC process, some of which have been the focus of citizen 
critiques. I discuss here three limitations that various commentators have 
identified. First, if the CEC Secretariat determines that a submission raises 
matters that deserve further consideration, the Secretariat can request 
additional information from the relevant party and then determine whether 
to dismiss the submission or to recommend to the Council that a factual 
record be developed.162 Some commentators have urged that submitters 
should have an opportunity to respond to a party’s response before the 
Secretariat makes its final decision as to whether to recommend 
 
the Agreement. This Part identifies some of these concerns as well. The commentary suggests, 
however, that the parties’ stances on a variety of issues are among the more significant features 
of implementation that have caused citizen dissatisfaction. 
 157 NAAEC, supra note 28, art. 14(1). 
 158 Id. 
 159 COMM’N FOR ENVTL. COOPERATION OF N. AM., BRINGING THE FACTS TO LIGHT A GUIDE TO 
ARTICLES 14 AND 15 OF THE NORTH AMERICAN AGREEMENT ON ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION 14 
(2000), available at http://www.cec.org/files/PDF/SEM/BringingFacts-Jun02_en.pdf [hereinafter 
BRINGING THE FACTS TO LIGHT]. Any dismissal of a submission is supposed to include an 
explanation of the reasons for the dismissal. Guidelines for Submissions, supra note 72, at 6.1. 
 160 For an overview of res judicata, see, for example, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS 
§ 17 (1982). 
 161 NAAEC, supra note 28, art. 15(4). 
 162 LESSONS LEARNED, supra note 29, at 4. 
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development of a factual record.163 In Lessons Learned, JPAC recommended 
that it would “improve public confidence in the decision making process” to 
allow submitters to submit a response, particularly where “a Party’s 
response includes new information not referred to in the original 
Submission.”164 
To address a second limitation on citizen participation in the process, 
after the Secretariat has submitted a recommendation to the Council to 
develop a factual record, JPAC and others have recommended that 
submitters should have an opportunity, if a party “chooses to submit 
additional information directly to the Council in response to such a 
recommendation from the Secretariat . . . to make a brief written reply to 
such information so that the Council can make a more fully informed 
decision on the Secretariat’s recommendation.”165 To date the Council has 
rejected these suggestions, stating that they would “lead to exchanges . . . 
that will result in a more adversarial public submissions process which we 
do not believe would benefit the process.”166 
A third limitation that citizens have identified in their opportunities to 
participate involves the Secretariat’s draft factual records. When the Council 
directs the Secretariat to prepare a factual record, the Secretariat develops a 
draft factual record, which it provides to the Council but is not authorized to 
share with the submitters for their review or comment.167 Thus, while the 
Secretariat obtains and considers the parties’ comments on draft factual 
records before it develops a final factual record, NGOs are not allowed to 
see the draft, let alone comment on it. As might be expected, the NGO 
community has balked at this uneven playing field in terms of its 
opportunities to participate.168 
Because of these limitations on citizen participation, Professor Yang 
has argued that “[o]nce a submission has been filed, the process is entirely 
controlled and managed by the Secretariat and Council.”169 While, as noted 
 
 163 Id. at 12. 
 164 Id. at 16. 
 165 Id. 
 166 COMM’N FOR ENVTL. COOPERATION OF N. AM., THE JPAC AT TEN: A REVIEW OF THE JOINT 
PUBLIC ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE NORTH AMERICAN COMMISSION FOR ENVIRONMENTAL 
COOPERATION 15 (2005) (quoting Letter from Council (Mar. 6, 2002)). 
 167 NAAEC, supra note 28, art. 15(5). 
 168 Two offsetting features of this process are: 1) the parties’ comments have ultimately 
become a matter of public record since the Secretariat has included such comments as 
appendices in its final factual records, which are available to the public; and 2) the parties’ 
comments are supposed to be limited to raising issues concerning the accuracy of the draft 
factual record, although that has not always been the case. See, e.g., BC Aboriginal Fisheries 
Commission et al. (SEM-97-001) (May 30, 2000), http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/sem/BC-Hydr-Fact-
record_en.pdf (last visited July 16, 2006). 
 169 Tseming Yang, The Effectiveness of the NAFTA Environmental Side Agreement’s Citizen 
Submission Process: A Case Study of Metales Y Derivados, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 443, 478 (2005). 
Cf. Jonathan Graubart, Giving Meaning to New Trade-Linked “Soft Law” Agreements on Social 
Values: A Law-in-Action Analysis of NAFTA’s Environmental Side Agreement, 6 UCLA J. INT’L L. 
& FOREIGN AFF. 425, 433 (2001) (suggesting that “each phase offers political opportunities for 
submitters to advance their underlying cause in terms of receiving official legitimacy for their 
concern, forcing a response form the government or advancing their issues on the governmental 
agenda”). 
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above, citizens do have the right to submit information as part of the factual 
record process, Professor Yang’s perspective likely captures the larger point, 
notably that limits in opportunities to participate may be a factor in citizen 
satisfaction. 
Two other more systemic limitations to participation deserve attention 
as well. First, the entire CEC process generally takes place through 
submission and exchanges of written documents. While the process is 
underway, there is little, if any, opportunity for citizens to engage the CEC 
decision-makers (the Secretariat or the Council); similarly, there is little, if 
any, formal opportunity for citizens to engage the party whose practices are 
at issue. Jody Freeman, among others, has argued that such interactions 
beyond the exchange of written materials have value. She suggests that 
“collaborative governance” (i.e., multi-stakeholder processes) are likely “to 
be sites at which regulatory problems are redefined, innovative solutions 
[are] devised, and institutional relationships [are] rethought.”170 While 
further research would be useful to determine the weight citizens attach to 
the lack of opportunity for such interactions, some citizens have complained 
that this limitation reduces the value of citizen participation, and also 
significantly reduces the utility of what they consider to be a “cooperative” 
rather than an adversarial process.171 On the other hand, another 
commentator has suggested that, despite this general limitation to formal, 
written exchanges, the process does enable or facilitate a dialogue, either in 
the context of the process itself, or at a domestic level, noting that the 
process: 
[I]s most effectively utilized where submitters are engaged in ongoing advocacy 
and wish to draw government into “discussion” on issues as framed by the 
submitters, or where the submitters are seeking a mechanism that will provide 
access to decision-makers or media. The citizen submission process also can 
assist in the building of international coalitions by providing a clear and visible 
 
 170 Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1, 
7 (1997). Freeman invokes the “republican principle [that] unanticipated or novel solutions are 
likely to emerge from face-to-face deliberative engagement among knowledgeable parties who 
would never otherwise share information or devise solutions together.” Id. at 22–23. 
 171 See JOINT PUB. ADVISORY COMM., WORKSHOP ON THE HISTORY OF CITIZEN SUBMISSIONS 
PURSUANT TO ARTICLES 14 AND 15 OF THE NORTH AMERICAN AGREEMENT ON ENVIRONMENTAL 
COOPERATION 3 (2000), available at http://www.cec.org/who_we_are/jpac/pdfs/sr-wrkshp-e.pdf 
[hereinafter JPAC WORKSHOP] (noting the views of Cliff Wallis that submitters should be 
allowed to present their case orally). The Commission further notes the views of Hervé Pageot 
that: 
The Party and the submitter should meet in the event that Council does not decide to 
proceed with the development of a factual record. The idea is that the system should 
encourage consensus, not provoke confrontation. In this way, submitter could ascertain 
the reasons adduced by Council as well as the positions of the other Parties. 
Id. at 3. JPAC notes that the BC Hydro Factual Record process, which included an opportunity 
for the key stakeholders to interact with the experts the Secretariat retained to assist with the 
Factual Record, “incorporated procedures to improve public participation that were not present 
in the Cozumel Pier Factual Record.” LESSONS LEARNED, supra note 29, at 5. 
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effort that other organizations can support.172 
 
Second, there is no support for citizens to participate in the process. 
Domestic environmental laws often provide attorneys’ fees to citizens, at 
least under certain circumstances.173 Some laws also provide NGOs with 
funding to enable them to hire technical support, in order to facilitate 
meaningful citizen participation.174 The CEC provides neither. Features of 
the CEC process may reduce the need for citizen support. The CEC 
Secretariat is supposed to serve as the neutral investigator of concerns that 
citizens raise (citizens act primarily as pullers of the CEC “fire alarm,” 
calling the Secretariat and parties to action); this arguably limits the need for 
extensive citizen submissions.175 Further, the CEC process is less process-
intensive than civil litigation in the United States since there is no discovery 
or other pre-trial work of the sort that characterizes such practice.176 Thus, 
at least in theory, the investment of citizens need not be as great to bring a 
case before the CEC as would be the case domestically.177 Another question 
that deserves follow-up involves the weight that citizens attach to such 
funding mechanisms and the importance of not including such a mechanism 
in the CEC process. 
A final issue relating to participation involves the extent to which the 
process helps inform citizens independent of their active participation in it. 
The CEC itself and outside commentators frequently have highlighted the 
importance of transparency. In its Framework for Public Participation in 
CEC Activities, for example, the CEC states that “the CEC endeavor[s] to 
conduct its activities in an open and transparent fashion.”178 In keeping with  
 
 172 Christensen, supra note 59, at 183. 
 173 See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (2000); ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, ET AL., 989 n.8; ENVIRONMENTAL 
PROTECTION: LAW AND POLICY (4th ed. 2003). 
 174 See, e.g., Markell, supra note 51, at 14 (discussing measures states have taken to 
encourage citizen participation, citing specifically efforts in New York). 
 175 Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police 
Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165 (1984) (comparing congressional “police-
patrol” oversight with citizen “fire-alarm” oversight). 
 176 Raymond MacCallum, Evaluating the Citizen Submission Procedure Under the North 
American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, 8 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 395, 421 
(1997) (noting that “the procedure potentially provides a means of private participation in the 
promotion of enforcement, which avoids the expense of domestic legal proceedings”). Related 
to this, Secretariat information-gathering efforts may obviate or diminish the need for citizen 
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests, which can be time consuming and expensive to 
pursue. 
 177 Some commentators suggest that Council decisions have made the process more difficult, 
time consuming, and expensive for submitters. See infra note 224. ELI suggests, for example, 
that the Council’s decision concerning the Ontario Logging submission “appears to add to the 
existing ‘pleading’ requirements of the NAAEC a new and higher evidentiary threshold for the 
sufficiency of information necessary to support allegations of non-enforcement.” ISSUES 
RELATED, supra note 29, at iv. ELI notes that doing so “potentially increases the financial and 
human resources burdens placed on [submitters].” Id. It cites some of the individuals it 
interviewed as arguing that “in setting the bar for ‘sufficient information’ too high, the Council 
may render it prohibitively difficult for citizens to participate in the process.” Id. 
 178 COMM’N FOR ENVTL. COOPERATION, FRAMEWORK FOR PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN COMMISSION 
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this objective, the Framework indicates that the public “should be provided 
with all relevant CEC documents . . . for their [the public’s] involvement in 
CEC activities.”179 
The process has the potential to inform citizens about government 
enforcement policies and practices and the government’s thinking in 
developing and implementing such policies and practices, because of the 
transparency of the process, the obligations it imposes on the governments 
to explain their actions (and inaction), and the opportunities it gives the 
Secretariat to explain its views and develop additional information.180 For 
example, citizens have access to countries’ responses to submissions, to the 
Secretariat’s reasoning concerning the submission in the form of the various 
documents the Secretariat issues in connection with each submission, to 
documents that others submit during the pendency of the factual record 
process, and to factual records themselves.181 Some commentators have 
suggested that the information flow the process generates, and the 
transparency of the process, are helpful to citizens, and ultimately to the 
formulation and implementation of environmental policy: 
The citizen submission process and the information systems operated by the 
CEC create political pressure by allowing public scrutiny of a NAFTA party’s 
record of effectively enforcing its domestic environmental laws. With improved 
information about and a clearer understanding of North American 
environmental issues, implementation of and compliance with NAAEC will be 
more effective. The NAAEC, in light of its objectives, clearly wanted more 
information to be made open to the public. The availability of information 
concerning environmental issues affects national behavior, and thus supports 
the effectiveness of the NAAEC.182 
Greg Block wrote in a 2003 article that: 
A number of Mexican nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and policy 
analysts attest to the positive impact the CEC has made on transparency in 
governmental decision making and access to information, as well as certain 
 
FOR ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION ACTIVITIES 5 (1999) available at http://www.cec.org/ 
files/pdf/publications/guide19_en.pdf. 
 179 Id. 
 180 See supra Part II.B and accompanying notes. 
 181 For a few years the Council delayed public release of Secretariat recommendations to 
prepare factual records, but it abandoned this approach in the face of considerable criticism. 
Council Res. 01-06, 1–2, C.E.C. Doc. C/01-00/RES/06/Rev. 4 (June 29, 2001), 
http://www.cec.org/files/PDF/COUNCIL/Res-06r4_EN.pdf (last visited July 16, 2006). Mexico, in 
particular, has received criticism for asserting confidentiality concerning some of the materials 
it has submitted and thereby reducing the transparency of the process. JOINT PUB. ADVISORY 
COMM., PUBLIC COMMENTS RELATED TO THE CITIZENS SUBMISSION PROCESS UNDER ARTICLES 14 AND 
15 OF THE NAAEC: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE/LESSONS LEARNED 2 (2001), available at 
http://www.cec.org/who_we_are/jpac/comments/EHC2.pdf. 
 182 Mark R. Goldschmidt, The Role of Transparency and Public Participation in International 
Environmental Agreements: The North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, 29 
B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV 343, 392 (2002). 
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aspects of domestic environmental policy. The CEC’s access to information 
policies, decision making records, citizen submission process, and public 
Council sessions have helped shape Mexican citizens’ expectations for the 
conduct of government business for national agencies and public institutions. 
That the Mexican Environmental Ministry is regarded as one of the more open 
and transparent Mexican government agencies is in a small, but not 
inconsequential way, due to its intense interaction with the CEC and civil 
society.183 
Professor Vega-Cánovas states that “the NAAEC appears to have 
enhanced the capacity of domestic interest groups to engage national 
government decision-makers in international relations” and indirectly 
influence government policy.184 
Thus, the procedural justice literature suggests that citizens’ 
opportunities to participate in decision making processes affect their degree 
of satisfaction with such processes. The CEC citizen submissions process 
affords citizens significant opportunities to participate, but citizens also 
have complained about some of the limitations in these opportunities. This 
discussion is intended to identify some of the positive aspects of 
opportunities to participate in the CEC process as well as citizen concerns. 
Further systematic inquiry will help to enhance understanding of citizens’ 
perspectives, and of whether there are ways to revamp the CEC process to 
engender greater citizen satisfaction with opportunities to participate. 
B. Neutrality and Trust 
There seems to be a significant overlap in these criteria, at least in 
 
 183 Greg Block, Trade and Environment in the Western Hemisphere: Expanding the North 
American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation into the Americas, 33 ENVTL. L. 501, 516 
(2003); see also Yang, supra note 169, at 443. Professor Yang notes that there are several points 
in the citizen submissions process that have the potential to produce information that otherwise 
might not see the light of day and, once made public, lead to improvements in domestic 
environmental enforcement practices. First, the existence of the process may trigger work by 
submitters to compile and present information in their submissions about domestic 
enforcement practices that would not be gathered and developed if the forum did not exist. 
Second, in its screening determinations early in the process the Secretariat provides an 
independent perspective on issues such as the types and extent of environmental harms 
potentially resulting from the enforcement practices at issue. Third, the country’s response 
often contains information about its enforcement practices that otherwise would not be 
gathered, developed or shared. Fourth, the Secretariat’s recommendations that a factual record 
be prepared provide another opportunity for this neutral body to review the assertions in the 
submission and the response of the country, and consider whether developing information 
would be likely to enhance domestic environmental enforcement, as well as serve other public 
policy goals (a Secretariat decision to dismiss a submission at this juncture also may add value 
by providing a neutral perspective about the weight or merit of the submitter’s concerns). The 
countries’ collective response to the Secretariat’s recommendations is another point for 
consideration of the enforcement practices at issue in a submission. Finally, the creation of a 
factual record provides extensive opportunity for obtaining, developing, and presenting 
substantial information about whether a country has failed to effectively enforce its 
environmental laws in a particular context. Id. 
 184 Gustavo Vega-Cánovas, NAFTA and the Environment, 30 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 55, 61 
(2001). 
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terms of the CEC process, making joint treatment appropriate. The CEC’s 
most recent commissioned report, the 2004 TRAC report, concludes that, in 
spite of various successes, one of the “important concerns” that has emerged 
is that the citizens’ submission process (“the NAAEC’s most innovative 
public participation mechanism”) “has become mired in controversy.”185 The 
TRAC report suggests that the Council’s performance in particular has 
raised concerns about the neutrality of the citizen submissions process and 
triggered a decline in trust. The TRAC Report, for example, quotes a 
submission from a team of legal advisors from the three countries who 
advise the Secretariat on the citizen submissions process that Council-
imposed restrictions on the scope of the process “ha[ve] the potential to 
permanently undermine the integrity of the process to the point where it is 
of limited interest to potential submitters.”186 The legal advisors highlighted 
the importance of public confidence in the process and the dangers posed by 
a loss of such confidence: “Process integrity and credibility are critical 
because it is a public process that relies on and is driven by the responses 
and actions of citizens and NGOs in the three countries.”187 
Other than citizen submitters, the CEC Secretariat and the CEC Council 
are the primary participants in the CEC citizen submissions process. Thus, 
this section examines the role that each of these entities has played for 
insights concerning the extent to which each is perceived to be neutral and 
has gained the trust of NGOs; and for insights concerning the implications of 
their performance for NGOs’ overall sense as to whether the process is 
neutral and deserves trust. 
To begin with the Secretariat, it is by no means inevitable that citizens 
would think highly of the Secretariat based on the institutional design of the 
CEC. The Council members appoint the CEC Executive Director.188 Thus, to 
the extent that citizens are leery of the parties as neutral actors because of 
their inherent conflict of interest in implementing the citizen submissions 
process (on the one hand, the parties are supposed to work together as the 
Council to support the Agreement, while on the other the parties are the 
subject or target of submissions),189 citizens might well be concerned that 
the Secretariat’s neutrality or independence is compromised by the 
Executive Director’s accountability to the parties.190 Further, the Executive 
Director traditionally has had a three year term, renewable one time at the 
discretion of the Council.191 NGOs might perceive that this arrangement 
 
 185 TRAC, supra note 29, at 5. 
 186 Id. at 45 (citing Memorandum from Geoffrey Garver, Dir., Submissions on Enforcement 
Matters Unit, to Jon Plaut, Chair, JPAC (Feb. 15, 2002) (on file with author)). 
 187 Id. I explore these issues in more detail in Governance of International Institutions, supra 
note 27. 
 188 Comm’n for Envtl. Cooperation, Rules of Employment, Rule 13, http://www.cec.org/ 
files/PDF/PUBLICATIONS/EMP-dec-2002_en.pdf (last visited July 16, 2006); NAAEC, supra note 
28, art. 11. 
 189 Governance of International Institutions, supra note 27. 
 190 Article 11(4) of the NAAEC is intended to ameliorate this concern, as well as related 
concerns about undue Party influence on CEC staff. See NAAEC, supra note 28, art. 11(4) 
(explaining NAAEC functions). 
 191 NAAEC, supra note 28, art. 11(1). 
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creates the potential that an Executive Director might try to curry favor with 
the Council in order to maximize the chances for renewal. 
 
The Council also has the possibility of influencing the selection and 
renewal of CEC staff, including members of the CEC Submissions Unit. The 
Council-appointed Executive Director appoints the CEC staff.192 In addition, 
the Council has a veto over such appointments.193 Further, CEC staff 
generally operate on two or three year renewable contracts, which creates 
similar potential leverage for the Council through its control of the identity 
of the Executive Director.194 
Another aspect of the CEC structure and operation that seemingly 
creates a potential for Secretariat bias in favor of the Council and against the 
interest of citizens whose submissions press the parties is that the 
Secretariat works closely with the Council on the “cooperative work 
program” of the CEC. Indeed, the vast majority of Secretariat professional 
staff focuses its attention on the cooperative program and the majority of 
the CEC’s budget is allocated to these activities.195 There is a chance that the 
Secretariat might favor the parties in the citizen submissions process in 
order to improve prospects for success for the cooperative program, and/or 
that citizens might perceive that this arrangement creates built-in Secretariat 
bias in favor of the parties. 
Finally, the Council and its surrogates (high level agency officials) meet 
regularly throughout the year with the Secretariat on various matters, 
including citizen submissions process issues. There is no corresponding final 
opportunity for citizens to engage the Secretariat in this way. JPAC’s 
presence at these meetings seemingly has the potential to offset this 
potential for imbalance (perceived and/or real) to some degree, but not 
entirely.196 
In short, because of the institutional design of the CEC, there are 
numerous reasons why citizens might be inclined to be wary of the 
Secretariat and skeptical of its neutrality. I now turn to the Secretariat’s 
track record in implementing the process for possible insights as to whether 
the Secretariat’s implementation of its responsibilities may have 
 
 192 Id. art. 11(2). 
 193 Id. art. 11(3). 
 194 I am not aware of any evidence that the structural features concerning the Executive 
Director or SEM Unit staff discussed in the text have raised concerns to date. The NAAEC 
makes clear the “international character” of the Secretariat staff and directs the parties to 
respect this character. Id. art. 11(4). Further, article 11(2)(a) specifies that staff be “appointed 
and retained . . . strictly on the basis of efficiency, competence and integrity.” Id. art. 11(2)(a). 
 195 See Comm’n for Envtl. Cooperation, Advice to Council No. 02-11 (Oct. 21, 2002), 
http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/JPAC/02-11eRev1.pdf (last visited July 16, 2006). 
 196 The JPAC is allowed to provide advice to the Council on any matter that is within the 
scope of the NAAEC. NAAEC, supra note 28, art. 16. In recent years, the JPAC has been a 
regular participant in Secretariat/Party meetings to facilitate the JPAC’s playing this role. See 
Wirth, supra note 40, at 199, 204–05 (describing JPAC’s relationship with the Secretariat). The 
concerns I raise in the text are, to the best of my knowledge, hypothetical in nature. I am not 
aware of any evidence that these institutional features have created a sense of skepticism 
concerning Secretariat neutrality, or that they have undermined such neutrality. See, supra note 
194. 
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exacerbated, or allayed, possible citizen concerns about Secretariat 
neutrality. 
 
The CEC Secretariat conducts an initial review of each submission 
based on a set of factors contained in the NAAEC (article 14(1) and 14(2)) 
and determines whether to consider the submission further or dismiss it.197 
If the Secretariat determines that the submission warrants further review, 
the Secretariat requests that the relevant party prepare and submit a written 
response to the submission.198 Otherwise, the Secretariat dismisses the 
submission, thereby completing consideration of the submission under the 
citizen submissions process.199 
The Secretariat’s track record in performing this early filtering function 
suggests that it has been fairly rigorous in its review. It certainly has not 
served as a “rubber stamp” for citizen complaints. As of December 31, 2005, 
sixteen submissions have been dismissed at the article 14(1) or (2) stage, 
and the Secretariat has requested a response for 36 submissions (see Table 
4). 
Table 4: Secretariat’s Decisions under article 14(1) and (2) (Through 
December 31, 2005)200 
 
 197 NAAEC, supra note 28, arts. 14(1), 14(2). 
 198 Id. art. 14(2). 
 199 The submitter may re-submit within 30 days and the Secretariat will review this revised 
submission. BRINGING THE FACTS TO LIGHT, supra note 159, at 12. 
 200 Table 4 was developed using data released by the Secretariat. COMM’N FOR ENVTL. 
COOPERATION, supra note 92. The actual handling of submissions complicates the picture at the 
margins since, in some cases, the Secretariat has issued two or more rulings at the 14(1) or 
14(2) stage. In some cases, for example, the Secretariat initially dismissed a submission, the 
submitter re-filed, and the Secretariat then requested a response from the party. See, e.g., 
Comm’n for Envtl. Cooperation, Citizen Submissions on Enforcement Matters, El Boludo 
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Thus, in exercising its filtering responsibility at this early stage of the 
citizen submissions process the Secretariat has dismissed more than 30% of 
the 52 submissions filed to date.201 
The Secretariat’s second decision, following the parties’ response,202 is 
to either recommend development of a factual record, or dismiss the 
submission. 203 A factual record, again, is the ultimate product of the citizen 
submissions process and is considered to be the most visible part of the CEC 
spotlight and the most comprehensive review of information relevant to the 
alleged enforcement failures.204 If the Secretariat determines that further 
review is appropriate through development of a factual record, the 
Secretariat provides a Recommendation to that effect to the Council (again, 
comprised of the leading environmental officials of the parties).205 The 
Recommendation contains the Secretariat’s analysis of the submission and 
response, and explains why the Secretariat thinks that further review of the 
allegations in the submission is warranted. Alternatively, the Secretariat is 
empowered to unilaterally dismiss a submission at this point in the 
process—thus, terminating consideration of the submission.206 
Here again, the Secretariat’s performance might be a source of concern 
 
Project, http://www.cec.org/citizen/submissions/details/index.cfm?varlan=english&ID=80 (last 
visited July 16, 2006). Thus, the number of Secretariat dismissals at this stage is greater than 
depicted in Table 4. Further, Table 4 also arguably over counts the number of submissions since 
some submissions were later re-filed outside the 30-day window. See, e.g., Comm’n for Envtl. 
Cooperation, Citizen Submissions on Enforcement Matters, Molymex I, 
http://www.cec.org/citizen/submissions/details/index.cfm?varlan=english&ID=54 (last visited 
July 15, 2006); Comm’n for Envtl. Cooperation, Citizen Submissions on Enforcement Matters, 
ALCA-Iztapalapa, http://www.cec.org/citizen/submissions/details/index.cfm?varlan=english& 
ID=81 (last visited July 16, 2006); Comm’n for Envtl. Cooperation, Citizen Submissions on 
Enforcement Matters, Environmental Pollution in Hermosillo, http://www.cec.org/ 
citizen/submissions/details/index.cfm?varlan=english&ID=100 (last visited July 16, 2006). 
 201 Secretariat rejection of a submission at the 14(1) stage should not necessarily be viewed 
as ‘anti-submitter.’ Such a rejection, followed by 30 days for re-filing, provides submitters with 
an opportunity to strengthen the submission so that it has a greater likelihood of producing a 
factual record. Further, submitters may re-file submissions that the Secretariat dismisses at the 
article 14(1) stage and in some cases such re-filed submissions have reached the factual record 
stage. See, e.g., Comm’n for Envtl. Cooperation, Citizen Submissions on Enforcement Matters, 
Molymex II, http://www.cec.org/citizen/submissions/details/index.cfm?varlan=english&ID=56 
(last visited July 16, 2006); Comm’n for Envtl. Cooperation, Citizen Submissions on 
Enforcement Matters, ALCA-Iztapalapa II, http://www.cec.org/citizen/submissions/details/ 
index.cfm?varlan=english&ID=93 (last visited May 28, 2006); Comm’n for Envtl. Cooperation, 
Citizen Submissions on Enforcement Matters, Environmental Pollution in Hermosillo II, 
http://www.cec.org/citizen/submissions/details/index.cfm?varlan=english&ID=108 (last visited 
July 16, 2006). 
 202 parties are not obligated to file a response if the Secretariat requests one, but thus far the 
parties uniformly have done so. BRINGING THE FACTS TO LIGHT, supra note 159, at 14. In either 
event, following its request for a response and any Party response, the Secretariat reaches a 
second decision stage. 
 203 See NAAEC, supra note 28, art. 15(1). 
 204 Several phases of the citizen submissions process have the potential to serve as a 
spotlight, but the creation of a factual record is the most significant part of this spotlighting 
process. See, e.g., Yang, supra note 169, at 456–57. 
 205 NAAEC, supra note 28, art. 15. 
 206 Id. 
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for submitters. 207 As of December 31, 2005, the Secretariat has made twenty- 
 
one recommendations to the Council that a factual record is warranted and 
dismissed eleven submissions after receiving a party’s response (see Table 5). 
Table 5: Secretariat Decisions to Recommend Factual Records or 
Dismiss Submissions Following a party Response ( 
Through December 31, 2005) 208 
 
Thus, the Secretariat has dismissed more than 1/3 of the submissions it has 
considered at this stage of the process.209 
In short, the Secretariat’s track record in performing these central 
functions in the citizen submissions process certainly does not reflect that 
the Secretariat has “rubber-stamped” submissions. Instead, the Secretariat 
has served as a fairly vigilant filter. Consequently, citizens may be 
disappointed with these Secretariat outcomes. This track record, in other 
words, might confirm citizens’ fears that they are not likely to receive much 
support from the Secretariat. 
The anecdotal feedback concerning the Secretariat’s performance 
 
 207 On the other hand, some submitters might believe that Secretariat decisions at the 15(1) 
stage have provided considerable information regarding the submitters’ assertions, in a way that 
might satisfy “procedural justice” concerns. 
 208 Table 5 was developed using data released by the Commission for Environmental 
Cooperation. Comm’n for Envtl. Cooperation, Who We Are / Council, http://cec.org/who_we_ 
are/council/resolutions/index.cfm?varlan=English (last visited July 14, 2006) [hereinafter Who 
We Are]. CEC Council Resolutions from 1994 through 2005 were reviewed to determine the 
number per year in which the CEC Secretariat made the decision to either recommend the 
preparation of a factual record under article 15(1) or to dismiss a submission following a party 
response under article 14(3) or 15(1). The number of those resolutions were then totaled 
separately as reflected above. 
 209 COMM’N FOR ENVTL. COOPERATION, supra note 92. 
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reflects confidence in the Secretariat’s neutrality and trust in its 
performance—despite possible concerns of the sort described above 
regarding institutional design and actual performance. External reviews of 
the citizen submissions process generally have given the Secretariat high 
marks for its impartiality and for the quality of the determinations issued. A 
1998 review of the CEC conducted by the Independent Review Committee 
(IRC) surveyed the work of the citizens submission process and some of the 
scholarly and other commentary about the process, and concluded that 
“[t]he record on the submissions that have been subject to Secretariat 
decisions to date appears to show a consistent and well reasoned group of 
decisions.”210 Furthermore, the report stated: 
While observers (and the Parties) may, and some certainly have, criticized 
specific decisions, this Committee has seen nothing to suggest that the 
decisions of the Secretariat lack proper foundation. Indeed, the IRC generally 
concurs with the view expressed by some commentators that the decision-
making by the Secretariat has been professional and appropriate.211 
Because of its favorable assessment, the IRC saw no reason to recommend 
refinements to the process.212 
More recent studies have generally been positive in their review of 
Secretariat performance—characterizing citizen perception of this 
performance as quite supportive. The TRAC 2004 report found that 
“[s]ubmitters and outside observers by and large believe that the Secretariat 
has performed its obligations well.”213 Chris Wold, the lawyer for the 
submitters who filed the only submission to lead to a factual record 
involving the United States, similarly has stated that “the Secretariat has 
established itself as a highly professional institution that carefully interprets 
the NAAEC in a way that promotes the NAAEC’s objectives.”214 Wold notes 
that “[s]cholars, NAAEC review committees, and members of the public are 
virtually unanimous in applauding the Secretariat’s rigorous review of 
submission for eligibility and for determination on whether a factual record 
 
 210 FOUR-YEAR REVIEW, supra note 29, § 3.3.3; see also, Chris Wold et al., supra note 58, at 421 
n.26 (discussing the Secretariat’s even-handed and objective approach toward eligibility and 
development of the factual record). 
 211 FOUR-YEAR REVIEW, supra note 29, § 3.3.3. Compare Kal Raustiala, International 
“Enforcement of Enforcement” Under the North American Agreement on Environmental 
Cooperation, 36 VA. J. INT’L L. 721, 730–43 (1996) (providing a favorable assessment of the 
Secretariat’s decisions in the citizen submissions process), with Tutchton, supra note 118, at 
48–69 (criticizing the Secretariat’s actions). 
 212 A study published around the same time found that citizens thought highly of the 
Secretariat’s performance. DiMento & Doughman, supra note 32, at 695–96 (reporting results of 
a survey the authors had undertaken concerning the process, and concluding that “[i]n general, 
respondents concluded that the response of the Secretariat to each of the submissions was 
appropriate”). 
 213 TRAC, supra note 29, at 45. The April 2001 JPAC Lessons Learned report reached much 
the same conclusion. LESSONS LEARNED, supra note 29, at 9–15 (noting also, though, that 
timeliness needs to be improved in operation of the process, including in the Secretariat’s 
performance of its responsibilities, and concluding that the Secretariat required additional 
resources to complete its work more expeditiously). 
 214 Wold et al., supra note 58, at 421 (2004). 
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is warranted.”215 
Thus, despite possible institutional design issues or concerns based on 
results or outcomes, anecdotal information suggests considerable NGO 
confidence or trust in the Secretariat’s performance of its responsibilities in 
the citizen submissions process.216 
The level of citizen trust in the Council and the individual parties, and 
the level of citizen confidence in the Council’s neutrality, appear, at least 
anecdotally, to be much lower.217 Part of this may be due to the 
institutionally-created “conflict of interest” that the structure of the process 
creates.218 At least superficially, on the other hand, there are parts of the 
track record of the Council’s performance in responding to individual 
submissions that seem quite supportive of the process, and therefore might 
have been expected to earn the Council credibility for its efforts. 
The parties’ first opportunity to participate in the CEC process comes 
when the CEC Secretariat determines that a submission warrants a party 
response.219 It is not clear how citizens view the parties’ performance at this 
stage of the process. It might be reasonable to assume that citizens generally 
would conclude that the parties’ participation at this stage reflects an effort 
to support the process since the countries have provided a formal, written 
response to each submission for which the Secretariat has requested one 
even though they are not legally obligated to do so.220 Indeed, many of these 
responses have been quite substantial.221 
 
 215 Id. See also Knox, supra note 105, at 383 (suggesting that “[t]he Secretariat’s impartiality 
and thoroughness, which it demonstrates by its careful quasi-judicial opinions as well as it 
rejection of submissions that do not meet the NAAEC criteria, lend its recommendations added 
weight”). 
 216 The TRAC Report notes that: “[g]overnmental officials have criticized the Secretariat’s 
lack of understanding of government decision-making processes and the political needs of 
Council members. All three parties have felt that the Secretariat has at some time exceeded its 
authority under NAAEC.” TRAC, supra note 29, at 32. The TRAC report does not offer much 
insight regarding the significance of the level of Party criticism (e.g., whether a Party is 
concerned with one possible instance of Secretariat “overreaching” or whether one or more 
parties believes the problem is more endemic), or regarding the merits of such concerns. 
 217 See infra notes 221, 233–72 and accompanying text. 
 218 In its Advice 03-05, JPAC noted that there is an “emerging perception” that the Council 
has a conflict of interest and noted that it may “reflect a structural challenge within the NAAEC 
itself.” Comm’n for Envtl. Cooperation, Advice to Council No: 03-05, 3, 
http://www.cec.org/files/PDF/JPAC/Advice03-05_EN.pdf (last visited May 28, 2006). Notably, 
JPAC and others have argued that “[i] these decisions/actions will adversely affect the 
credibility of the process; and [ii] they will contribute to an emerging perception of the Council 
members operating with a conflict of interest.” TRAC, supra note 29, at 45; see also Governance 
of International Institutions, supra note 27, at 780–87. 
 219 NAAEC, supra note 28, art. 14(2). 
 220 Id. 
 221 See, e.g., U.S. Response, Great Lakes (SEM-98-003), C.E.C. Doc. A14/SEM/98-003/RSP 
(Mar. 12, 1999), http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/sem/98-3-rsp-e.pdf (last visited July 16, 2006). Other 
responses have contained little information of value. Further, Mexico has asserted 
confidentiality concerning at least part of several of its formal, written responses, thereby 
preventing the public from reviewing them, despite the NAAEC’s strong overall objective of 
promoting transparency and frequent statements by the Council supporting this objective. See, 
e.g., Council Res. 00-09, C.E.C. Doc. C/00-00/RES/09/Rev.2 (June 13, 2000), 
http://www.cec.org/files/PDF/COUNCIL/00-09e_EN.pdf (last visited May 28, 2006) (favoring 
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On the other hand, skeptical citizens, particularly, might not find much 
solace in the parties’ having provided responses, since in many of their 
responses the parties have argued that further investigation or information 
gathering (that is, development of a factual record) is not appropriate.222 
Instead, in many responses the party involved has urged the Secretariat to 
dismiss the submission.223 Thus, if the parties’ positions at this stage had 
prevailed, the citizen submissions process would have produced few factual 
records, despite its operation for more than ten years. My own intuitive 
sense is that a substantively valuable response is likely to earn a party 
credibility with many submitters, even if the party ultimately urges dismissal 
of the submission, but this question deserves further investigation. 
The first opportunity for the Council as a whole to participate in the 
CEC citizen submission processes arises in response to a Secretariat 
recommendation to the Council that a factual record be developed. When it 
receives a Recommendation from the Secretariat, the Council decides, by 
two-thirds vote, whether to direct the Secretariat to proceed with 
development of a “factual record”224 or whether to reject such a 
Recommendation and direct dismissal of the submission.225 As Table 6 
reflects, as of December 31, 2005, the Council has authorized the Secretariat 
to prepare factual records for sixteen submissions and it has directed the 
Secretariat to dismiss two submissions.226 
 
transparency); JPAC Advisory Committee Session No. 00-01, C.E.C. Doc. J/00-02/SR (March 23–
24, 2000), http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/JPAC/SR0001E_EN.PDF (last visited May 28, 2006); 
Comm’n for Envtl. Cooperation, Citizen Submissions on Enforcement Matters, Crushed Gravel 
in Puerto Penasco, http://www.cec.org/citizen/submissions/details/index.cfm?varlan= 
english&ID=106 (last visited July 16, 2006); Comm’n for Envtl. Cooperation, Citizen 
Submissions on Enforcement Matters, Lake Chapala II, http://www.cec.org/citizen/submissions/ 
details/index.cfm?varlan=english&ID=90 (last visited July 16, 2006); see also LESSONS LEARNED, 
supra note 29, at 11 (noting that “[s]everal commentators expressed concern regarding what 
they perceived as an increase in parties’ reliance on the confidentiality provisions of articles 39 
and 42”). 
 222 See, e.g., Canada Response, BC Hydro (SEM-97-001), C.E.C. Doc. A14/SEM/97-001/05/RSP 
(July 21, 1997), http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/sem/97-1-RSP-E.PDF (last visited Jul 16, 2006); U.S. 
Response, Migratory Birds (SEM-99-002), C.E.C. Doc. A14/SEM/99-002/04/RSP (Feb. 29, 2000), 
http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/sem/ACF1842.PDF (last visited July 16, 2006). This has not always 
been the case. 
 223 LESSONS LEARNED, supra note 29, at 11–12. 
 224 NAAEC, supra note 28, art. 15(2). 
 225 Id. 
 226 The Council initially deferred consideration of the Oldman River submission before 
voting to endorse a factual record for this submission. Compare Council Res. 00-02, 1, C.E.C. 
Doc. C/C.01/00-04/RES/02 (May 16, 2000), http://www.cec.org/files/PDF/COUNCIL/00-
02e_EN.pdf (last visited July 16, 2006) (deferring consideration), with Council Res. 01-08, 2, 
C.E.C. Doc. C/C.01/01-06/RES/03/Final (Nov. 16, 2001), http://www.cec.org/files/PDF/ 
COUNCIL/res-01-08e.pdf (last visited July 16, 2006) (endorsing factual record). Similarly, the 
Council initially deferred consideration of the Secretariat recommendation to prepare a factual 
record for SEM-02-001 and later issued a Resolution directing preparation of a factual record for 
this submission. See Council Res. 03-05, C.E.C. Doc. C/C.01/03-02/RES/05/final (Apr. 22, 2003), 
http://www.cec.org/files/PDF/COUNCIL/Res-Ontario-Logging_en.pdf (last visited July 16, 2006); 
Council Res. 04-03, C.E.C. Doc. C/C.01/04-01/RES/03 (Mar. 12, 2004), 
http://www.cec.org/files/PDF/COUNCIL/Ontario-Logging-Res-04-03_en.pdf (last visited July 16, 
2006). In Council Resolution 05-04 (issued Apr. 1, 2005), the Council directed the Secretariat to 
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Table 6: Council Resolutions Authorizing Factual Records or 
Dismissing Decisions227 
 
Thus, in the vast majority of cases to come before it (88%), the Council 
has appeared to be responsive to citizen concerns and Secretariat judgments 
that such concerns warrant more in-depth review and attention from the 
citizen submissions process. Interestingly, this is the case even though in 
many of the submissions for which the Secretariat recommended that a 
factual record be developed, the party whose enforcement practices were at 
issue had initially urged dismissal of the submission. 228 One might 
reasonably conclude that citizens would be satisfied with, and supportive of, 
the Council’s record at this first decision point in the process. 
The second Council decision point in the process involves the decision 
whether to approve release of a final factual record. As noted above, 
following the Secretariat’s development of a draft factual record, the 
Secretariat seeks comments from the Council concerning the accuracy of 
the draft, develops a final factual record, and submits this final record to the 
Council.229 It then is up to the Council to decide, by two-thirds vote, whether 
to release the factual record to the public. 230 The Council has voted 
 
prepare a factual record for SEM-04-006, and directed that the Secretariat consolidate this 
submission with the Ontario Logging submission (SEM-02-001) “for the purpose of developing 
one consolidated factual record for both submissions.” Council Res. 05-04, C.E.C. Doc. 
C/C.01/05/RES//04/Final (Apr. 1, 2005), http://www.cec.org/files/PDF/COUNCIL/Res-05-04_ 
en.pdf (last visited July 165, 2006). 
 227 Table 6 was developed using data released by the Secretariat. COMM’N FOR ENVTL. 
COOPERATION, supra note 92. 
 228 See supra note 222. 
 229 See supra notes 71–81 and accompanying text (describing in more detail the Council’s 
process for approving release of a final factual record). 
 230 NAAEC, supra note 28, art. 15(7). 
16
2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
No. of Council Resolutions
Authorizing Preparation of a
Factual Record
No. of Council Resolutions
Specifically Instructing
Secretariat Not to Prepare a
Factual Record
698 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW [Vol. 36:651 
unanimously to release the factual records that the Secretariat has 
submitted.231 
All in all, the Council’s record seems supportive of the submissions 
process and would seem likely to engender confidence that the Council is 
maintaining a neutral stance in performing its role and has earned the trust 
of interested parties. In particular, in the vast majority of cases (sixteen out 
of eighteen) the Council has endorsed the Secretariat’s recommendation that 
a factual record be developed.232 For each of the affirmative votes, the 
Council endorsement has been unanimous.233 Even the party that has been 
the subject of the submission has voted to pursue a factual record.234 The 
fact that for several submissions the targeted party on its own viewed the 
submission as being unworthy of further review under the process, and then 
later acceded to such further review, 235 arguably also lends support for the 
notion that the parties are able, when acting as the Council, to put aside any 
parochial perspective that otherwise might be ascribed to them and operate 
as custodians of the process. Bolstering the seemingly positive nature of this 
Council track record is the fact that the Council has unanimously approved 
the release of final factual records.236 
 
 231 See Who We Are, supra note 208 (providing Council resolutions from 1994 through the 
present). 
 232 See supra Table 6. 
 233 See Who We Are, supra note 209. 
 234 Id. 
 235 See, e.g., Submission, BC Hydro (SEM-97-001), C.E.C. Doc. A14/SEM/97-001/01/SUB* 
(April 2, 1997), http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/sem/ACF756.pdf (last visited July 16, 2006). In its 
response, Canada urged that a factual record was not appropriate. Canada Response, BC Hydro 
(SEM-97-001), C.E.C. Doc. A14/SEM/97-001/05/RSP (July 21, 1997), 
http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/sem/97-1-RSP-E.PDF (last visited July 16, 2006). But in Council 
Resolution 98-07 Canada joined the United States and Mexico in voting to develop a factual 
record. Council Res. 98-07, 1, C.E.C. Doc. C/C.01/98-00/RES/03/Rev.3 (June 24, 1998), 
http://www.cec.org/files/PDF/COUNCIL/98-07e_EN.pdf (last visited July 16, 2006). 
 236 See Council Res. 04-07, C.E.C. Doc. C/C.01/06/RES/1/final (Sept. 24, 2004), 
http://www.cec.org/files/PDF/COUNCIL/RES-04-07_en.pdf (last visited July 16, 2006) (making 
public the factual record for Molymex II (SEM-00-005)); Council Res. 03-03, C.E.C. Doc. 
C/C.01/03-02/RES/03/Final (April 22, 2003), http://www.cec.org/files/PDF/COUNCIL/Res-
MBTA_en.pdf (last visited July 16, 2006) (making public the factual record for Migratory Birds 
(SEM–98-007)); Council Res. 02-01, C.E.C. Doc. C/C.01/02-01/RES/01/Final (Feb. 7, 2002), 
http://www.cec.org/files/PDF/COUNCIL/RES02-01Metales-eng.PDF (last visited July 16, 2006) 
(making public the factual record for Metales y Derivados (SEM-98-007)); Council Res. 00-04, 
C.E.C. Doc. C/00-00/RES/08/Rev.1 (June 11, 2000), http://www.cec.org/files/PDF/COUNCIL/00-
04e_EN.pdf (last visited July 16, 2006) (making public the factual record for BC Hydro (SEM-97-
001)); Council Res. 03-06, C.E.C. Doc. C/C.01/03-05/RES/06 (June 23, 2003), 
http://www.cec.org/files/PDF/COUNCIL/Res-Aquanova-06-final_en.pdf (last visited July 16, 
2006) (making public the factual record for Aquanova (SEM-98-006)). Council Res. 03-12, C.E.C. 
Doc. C/C.01/03-06/RES/12/final (Aug. 7, 2003), http://www.cec.org/files/PDF/COUNCIL/Res-BC-
Logging-03-12_en.pdf (last visited July 16, 2006) (making public the factual record for BC 
Logging (SEM-00-004); Council Res. 03-13, C.E.C. Doc. C/C.01/03-06/RES/13/final (Aug. 7, 2003), 
http://www.cec.org/files/PDF/COUNCIL/Res-oldman-river-II_en.pdf (last visited July 16, 2006) 
(making public the factual record for Oldman River II (SEM-97-006)); Council Res. 03-04, C.E.C. 
Doc. C/C.01/03-02/RES/04/final (Apr. 22, 2003), http://www.cec.org/files/PDF/COUNCIL/Res-
Tarahumara_en.pdf (last visited July 16, 2006) (making public the factual record for 
Tarahumara (SEM-00-006)); Council Res. 03-15, C.E.C. Doc. C/C.01/03-06/RES/15/final (May 12, 
2003), http://www.cec.org/files/PDF/COUNCIL/Res-magdalena-03-15_en.pdf (last visited July 16, 
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Nevertheless, there are abundant signs in the commentary about the 
process that citizens do not have complete trust in the Council or the 
individual parties, and that citizens lack confidence in the neutrality of any 
of the government actors. The sense one gets is that the submitter (and 
prospective submitter) community views the Council as being distinctly 
unenthusiastic about the process. There is considerable evidence that 
submitters consider the Council extremely reluctant to fulfill its 
responsibilities and, in many cases, as affirmatively undermining the 
process. 
The Council appears to have created this sentiment not only in actions 
relating to particular submissions, but also in more routine interventions in 
the process. Five specific instances of Council actions are illustrative of the 
types of actions the Council has undertaken that appear to have sowed 
distrust and a sense of lack of neutrality.237 
First critics have criticized the Council for purportedly overstepping its 
authority, and intruding on or usurping the responsibilities and authority of 
the CEC Secretariat. As suggested above, the parties have not retained 
plenary authority to make the decisions required under the citizen 
submissions process.238 Instead, they have given the Secretariat certain 
responsibilities and a significant degree of independence in the 
implementation of the process, while also giving submitters certain powers 
as well (notably, for present purposes, the power to launch the process and 
thereby identify the alleged failures to enforce effectively  that should 
receive detailed scrutiny). Also, as suggested elsewhere, the question of 
boundaries of authority has arisen several times during the early years of the 
 
2006) (making public the factual record for Rio Magdalena (SEM-97-002)). The Council has not 
electronically provided a Resolution authorizing release of the Cozumel factual record (SEM-96-
001). 
 237 I have not tried to include every nuance in the process that raises procedural justice 
concerns. Instead, I have focused on what appear to be among the more significant concerns. 
Other Council actions have triggered procedural justice concerns as well. For example, the 
TRAC Report identifies other complaints submitters have made of the parties, such as not 
providing information that the Secretariat has requested, delaying the process, and attempting 
to pre-empt CEC review through “desultory enforcement actions.” TRAC, supra note 29, at 46. 
The TRAC Report similarly found that “[m]any observers” perceived the Council’s four 
November 2001 Resolutions as “contradicting” a 2000 Council Resolution that implied that the 
Council would ask JPAC to “review changes to the process before they were introduced.” Id. at 
44. To provide examples of other complaints not discussed in the text, Randy Christiansen 
indicated that the BC Hydro submitters “alleged that the process was compromised by non-
cooperation and political interference by the Government of Canada, resulting in a less valuable 
factual record than was possible.” Christensen, supra note 59, at 175. Chris Wold identified 
three “principal means” in which the Council has, in his view, undermined the process: 
The Council has adversely affected the ability of the Citizen Submission Process to 
achieve better environmental results. The Council has degraded the process through 
three principal means: 1) disallowing examinations of allegations of a broad pattern of 
ineffective enforcement, 2) limiting the scope of factual records and 3) questioning the 
sufficiency of information. 
Wold, et al., supra note 58, at 423. 
 238 See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
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process.239 A common theme of the NGO community and of scholarly and 
other commentary is that, for the process to operate as intended (and for it 
to be credible with “civil society”), the parties need to do a better job of 
adhering to the self-imposed limits contained in the NAAEC and, relatedly, 
to accord appropriate respect to the Secretariat’s integral role in the 
process.240 The 2004 TRAC Report notes that “if many have criticized the 
Council for not providing sufficient overall direction to the Secretariat’s 
environmental cooperation program, they have also expressed concern 
about the Council exercizing [sic] too much direction on the administration 
of articles 14/15 where the Secretariat has specific responsibilities under the 
NAAEC.”241 It reports that interested stakeholders have argued that “the 
Council has exceeded its legal authority by making decisions that the 
NAAEC assigns to the Secretariat . . . .”242 ELI concluded that this Council 
overreaching has jeopardized “public trust” in the process.243 
One clear criticism has been that when the Council issued four 
Resolutions in November 2001 that authorized the Secretariat to develop 
factual records, as the Secretariat had recommended, the Council changed 
the focus of factual records sought by submitters.244 While these 
submissions alleged widespread failures to enforce,245 supported by the 
 
 239 Governance of International Institutions, supra note 27, at 762-780 (primarily focusing on 
the question of boundaries of authority and discussing in more detail the issues here discussed). 
Some early commentators anticipated these tensions. See, e.g., JOHNSON & BEAULIEU, supra note 
29, at 131–69 (charting creation and the structural conflicts inherent in NAAEC); FOUR-YEAR 
REVIEW, supra note 29 (describing division of responsibilities and noting the separation of 
authority). Numerous observers have commented on the presence of such tensions. See, e.g., 
Christopher Tollefson, Games Without Frontiers: Investor Claims and Citizen Submissions 
Under the NAFTA Regime, 27 YALE J. INT’L L. 141, 175 (2001) (noting tension surrounding the 
submissions procedure). See generally Knox, supra note 60; Paul Stanton Kibel, The Paper Tiger 
Awakens: North American Environmental Law After the Cozumel Reef Case, 39 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 395 (2001). 
 240 Governance of International Institutions, supra note 27, at 762–80; see, e.g., Comm’n for 
Envtl. Cooperation, Advice to Council No: 01-07 (Oct. 23, 2001), 
http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/JPAC/01-07E.pdf (last visited May 28, 2006) (expressing frustration 
with the council’s actions in connection with the citizen submissions process). 
 241 TRAC, supra note 29, at 32. 
 242 TRAC, supra note 29, at 45. 
 243 ISSUES RELATED, supra note 29, at 23–24 (providing opposing views on the authority of the 
Council); see also Id. at iii (noting that to be effective, the Secretariat “needs to maintain its 
independence as a neutral investigative body in order to ensure public trust in the [citizen 
submissions] process”). 
 244 Council Res. 01-08, C.E.C. Doc. C/C.01/01-06/RES/03/FINAL (Nov. 16, 2001), http://www 
.cec.org/files/PDF/COUNCIL/res-01-08e.pdf (last visited Apr. 11, 2006); Council Res. 01-10, 
C.E.C. Doc. C/C.01/01-06/RES/01/FINAL (Nov. 16, 2001), http://www.cec.org/ 
files/PDF/COUNCIL/res-01-09e.pdf (last visited Apr. 11, 2006); Council Res. 01-10, C.E.C. Doc. 
C/C.01/01-06/RES/04/FINAL (Nov. 16, 2001), http://www.cec.org/files/PDF/COUNCIL/res-01-
10e.pdf (last visited Apr. 11, 2006); Council Res. 01-11, C.E.C. Doc. C/C.01/01-06/RES/05/FINAL 
(Nov. 16, 2001), http://www.cec.org/files/PDF/COUNCIL/res01-11e.pdf (last visited Apr. 11, 
2006). 
 245 Alliance for the Wild Rockies, et al, Submission to the Commission on Environmental 
Cooperation Pursuant to Article 14 of the North American Agreement on Environmental 
Cooperation, (SEM 99-002), C.E.C. Doc. A14/SEM-99-002/01/SUB (Nov. 17, 1999), 
http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/sem/99-2-SUB-E.pdf (last visited May 21, 2006) (alleging failure to 
enforce effectively the Migratory Bird Treaty Act in the United States). 
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Secretariat’s Recommendations to develop factual records of a scope broad 
enough to detect such failures, the Council’s Resolutions directed the 
Secretariat to only develop factual records concerning the specific examples 
of failures to enforce effectively asserted by the submitters.246 A February 
2002 memorandum from the director of the CEC Secretariat’s submissions 
unit to the chair of the JPAC makes this clear: 
[T]he Council included instructions [in the four Resolutions] to prepare factual 
records regarding specific cases raised in the submissions, but did not include 
instructions regarding allegations in each of those submissions of widespread 
failures to effectively enforce environmental laws. For each of those four 
submissions, the Secretariat had recommended preparing factual records in 
regard to the widespread allegations of failures to effectively enforce.247 
In its review of the Council’s actions, ELI concluded that “[p]ersuasive 
textual arguments can be and have been made to suggest that the Council’s 
resolutions were not within the scope of authority granted to it under the 
NAAEC.”248 ELI continued by stating that the Council’s actions also “appear 
to violate the object and purpose, or ‘spirit,’ of the Agreement, the 
fundamental objectives of which include the enhancement of transparency 
and public participation in environmental decision making.”249 ELI 
concluded that “by intervening in the fact-finding process, the Council [was] 
undermining the independence of the Secretariat and the credibility of the 
process.”250 
The Council’s actions may have contributed to a loss of citizen trust in 
the citizen submissions process or trust in the Council, and thereby may 
have potentially contributed to a decline in use of the process. As the TRAC 
report concludes: 
There is an argument to be made that the process could generate more 
environmental benefits if the Council sought to restrict it less. Some observers 
have argued, for example, that the actions of the Council have eroded the 
 
 246 See supra note 239 (containing Secretariat’s recommendations). 
 247 Memorandum from Geoffrey Garver, Director, Submissions on Enforcement Matters 
Unit, requesting information on issues in JPAC Advice to Council 01-09, 2 (Feb. 15, 2002), 
available at www.cec.org/files/PDF/SEM/Memo-garver-e.pdf. ELI has reached this conclusion as 
well, noting that the Council “significantly narrowed the scope of the investigation” in each of 
its Resolutions. ISSUES RELATED, supra note 29, at iii. ELI notes that: 
“[a]lthough the Council approved the preparation of factual records with respect to each 
of these submissions, it significantly narrowed the scope of the investigation. That is, 
rather than order the preparation of factual records on the alleged widespread failure to 
effectively enforce, it instructed the Secretariat to develop factual records concerning 
only specific examples of the alleged widespread failure that were detailed in the 
submission.” 
Id. at 5–6. As might be expected, NGOs, including several submitters, have articulated this view 
and criticized the Council for its actions. Governance of International Institutions, supra note 
27, at 781–93. 
 248 ISSUES RELATED, supra note 29, at iv. 
 249 Id. 
 250 Id. 
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credibility of the process and are directly responsible for the fact that no new  
 
 
submissions have been brought against the United States Government in the 
last four years and that large environmental NGOs are not using the process.251 
A second criticism is that the Council has taken actions that have 
circumscribed the scope of the CEC process and thereby limited its utility. 
The TRAC Report notes that “[t]he Council has adopted a series of measures 
over the years to narrow the process’s scope.”252 It also notes that “JPAC, the 
NACs, the US GAC, academics, independent observers and NGOs have 
widely and repeatedly criticized the Council for these actions.”253 
Citizens have criticized the four November 2001 Council Resolutions 
discussed above as an example of Council actions that have sought to 
narrow the scope of the process and the types of enforcement failures that it 
may address. In an October 2003 report to JPAC concerning these four 
Resolutions, ELI concluded that: 
[T]he Council jeopardized the ability of those [factual] records to fully expose 
the controversy at issue. Specifically, the factual records were not able to 
address evidence of widespread enforcement failures, cumulative effects that 
stem from such widespread patterns, or the broader concerns of submitters 
about implementation of enforcement policies.254 
The Secretariat, as well as outside observers such as ELI, have highlighted 
specific ways in which the Resolutions changed (and limited) the types of 
information the Secretariat developed compared to the types of information 
it would have developed had the Resolutions endorsed the submissions and 
recommendations.255 Chris Wold, among others, has claimed that the 
Council Resolutions, in rejecting broad-based factual records that focus on 
alleged widespread enforcement failures, significantly reduced the value of 
the citizen submissions process because, at least in the United States, it is 
those types of enforcement failures that citizens have limited ability to 
address through domestic mechanisms: 
Submitters quickly recognized that the process was especially useful when 
examining a broader pattern of government conduct which, if not adequately 
justified or explained, might reveal a systematic failure to enforce 
environmental law. This is especially true in the United States where the 
Supreme Court has ruled that an agency’s decision not to take enforcement 
action with respect to a specific case is “presumed immune from judicial 
review.”256 
 
 251 TRAC, supra note 29, at 46. 
 252 Id. at 44. 
 253 Id. at 45. 
 254 ISSUES RELATED, supra note 29, at iv. 
 255 ISSUES RELATED, supra note 29, at 6–13, 27 (2003); Kibel, supra note 239, at 416–71; 
Christensen, supra note 59, at 178–80. 
 256 Wold et al., supra note 58, at 423 (quoting Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985)). 
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In a recent article, Wold says explicitly: 
Without question, the submitters would never have prepared Migratory Birds if 
they had known that the Council would, in an arbitrary and unexplained 
fashion, limit the record to two specific instances cited only as examples of 
widespread government nonenforcement. 257 
He indicates that “[t]he Migratory Birds submitters found the Citizen 
Submission Process attractive only because of its capacity to investigate the 
United States’ broad pattern of nonenforcement of the MBTA.”258 His 
conclusion about the results of the Council’s narrowing the scope of the 
factual record in connection with the submission he prepared does not 
inspire much confidence in citizens’ current perceptions of the value of the 
process: 
The absurdity of the result is patent: the Council directed the Secretariat to 
develop a factual record in Migratory Birds that resembled neither the issues 
presented by the submitters nor those recommended for study by the 
Secretariat. Indeed, it is the factual record that nobody wanted.259 
Third, the Council has been criticized for failing adequately to explain 
its decisions, particularly when it rejects Secretariat recommendations to 
prepare factual records.260 The Council, in the first resolution that rejected a 
Secretariat recommendation to prepare a factual record, provided no 
explanation at all for the Council’s decision.261 John Knox noted that the 
Council “simply denied the development of a factual record without further 
explanation,” and charged that “such a decision runs counter to the entire 
conception of NACEC and NAAEC.” 262 
 
 257 Id. at 426. 
 258 Id. 
 259 Id. at 427. Randy Christensen offers a similar view on this issue: 
Unfortunately, initial predictions that the mechanism was vulnerable to political 
manipulation have proven accurate over 10 years. Council actions have prevented a 
fulsome investigation of allegations of enforcement failure in many cases, depriving 
submitters and the public generally of a unique opportunity for discussing enforcement 
failures and improving environmental law enforcement. Given initial objections to the 
citizen submission process by the Canadian and Mexican governments . . . it is not 
surprising that Parties have used their powers to influence the process. 
Christensen, supra note 59, at 180–81. 
 260 The Council later explained its reasons for limiting the scope of factual records in a June 
2004 letter to JPAC. Letter from José Manuel Bulas Montoro, Alternate Representative for 
Mexico, Council of the Comm’n for Envtl. Cooperation, to Donna Tingley, 2004 Chair, Joint Pub. 
Advisory Comm., Comm’n for Envtl. Cooperation (June 3, 2004) (on file with author). The 
Council also addresses the “sufficiency of information” issue in this letter. Id. 
 261 Council Res. 00-01, C.E.C. Doc. C/C.01/00-04/RES/0/Rev.03 (May 16, 2000), 
http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/COUNCIL/res01r3e_EN.pdf (last visited July 15, 2006). 
 262 See JPAC WORKSHOP, supra note 171, at 4 (reporting a paraphrasing of all participants’ 
comments). John Knox commented that Council should explain in all cases why it adopted a 
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In response to this criticism, in 2001 the Council agreed to explain its 
rationale for dismissing submissions for which the Secretariat had 
recommended development of a factual record,263 but the explanation the 
Council has provided to date has been of limited utility.264 
It is likely that the JPAC, in Lessons Learned, has captured the public’s 
view of this state of affairs, notably that the Council should provide 
reasoned explanations for its decisions, just as is expected of the 
Secretariat: 
The articles 14 and 15 process should . . . be characterized by decision-making 
that is open, informed and reasoned. The current Guidelines require the 
Secretariat staff to indicate its reasons for a decision under article 15(1) to 
recommend a factual record and at certain other decision-making points within 
the article 14(1) and (2) reviews. These requirements provide the Parties, the 
Council and the public with the requisite confidence that the review is being 
conducted both openly and on a reasoned basis. For this reason, similar 
considerations should govern any Council decision not to accept the 
Secretariat’s recommendation to develop a factual record. The obligation to 
state substantive reasons for important governmental decisions affecting the 
environment should not be seen as an unreasonable burden, particularly where 
the Secretariat has, after investigation, indicated its reasons for recommending 
such a factual record.265 
Fourth, the Council has taken actions that citizens have complained 
make it more difficult for them to use the process effectively.266 The 2004 
 
Resolution on whether or not to develop a factual record. Id. Knox pointed out that this did not 
occur in the Quebec Hog Farm case. Id. 
 263 Council Res. 01-06, 2, C.E.C. Doc. C/01-00/RES/06/Rev.4 (June 29, 2001), 
http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/COUNCIL/Res-06r4_EN.pdf (last visited July 16, 2006). 
 264 See Council Res. 02-03, C.E.C. Doc. C/C.01/02-01/RES/03/Final (May 17, 2002), 
http://www.cec.org/files/PDF/COUNCIL/council_res_02-03_en.pdf (last visited July 16, 2006). 
 265 LESSONS LEARNED, supra note 29, at 15–16. Also related to the issue of reasoned 
explanations, the Council has been characterized as opposing allowing the Secretariat to reach 
formal conclusions, or to make recommendations, regarding allegations of a failure to 
effectively enforce, and several commentators have criticized this aspect of the process. JPAC 
WORKSHOP, supra note 171, at 7–8. John Knox’s comments were summarized as contending that 
[E]ven though NAAEC does not explicitly prohibit factual records from containing 
conclusion or recommendations, that is a point that JPAC should not support, since the 
Parties are convinced that the purpose of factual records is not to reach conclusions of 
law. . . . [Knox] felt the battle is not worth fighting, since the Parties will most certainly 
put up a resistance. 
Id.; see also LESSONS LEARNED, supra note 29, at 13, stating that: 
[M]any commentators believed that factual records should be able to reach 
conclusions . . . as to a Party’s “effective enforcement of its environmental law” . . . and 
should also include recommendations for further action by a Party to impose the 
effectiveness of such enforcement. Other, however, believed that JPAC should not 
support such an approach since the Parties believe that the purpose of factual records is 
not to reach “conclusions of law” and will resist these proposals. 
Id. These concerns seemingly raise distributive as well as procedural justice concerns. 
 266 JPAC WORKSHOP, supra note 171, at 5. 
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TRAC report suggests that Council actions “may make it prohibitively 
difficult for citizens to file submissions.”267 Similarly, in its 2003 report ELI 
indicates that the Council has increased the burden on submitters—that the 
increased level of specificity required means that concerned citizens groups 
must expend more in manpower and money to research exact violations 
rather than just relying on “evidence of widespread, systemic failures to 
enforce” environmental laws.268 As JPAC put it in a 2003 memo, “[d]efining 
the scope of factual records to require citizens’ groups to detail every 
specific violation to be included in the Secretariat’s investigations potentially 
increases the financial and human resources burdens placed on these 
groups.”269 
Finally, there is the issue of confidentiality. Despite the emphasis the 
NAAEC gives to increasing transparency and accountability,270 the Council 
has on occasion taken actions that reduce transparency, and these actions 
have triggered complaints from citizens. For example, in 1999 the Council 
acted to preclude the Secretariat from making public its recommendation to 
the Council to develop a factual record until thirty days had passed.271 In 
Lessons Learned, the JPAC summarized citizen sentiment on this Council-
imposed limitation on transparency as follows: 
The commentators spoke virtually as one against the requirements that a 
Secretariat recommendation to the Council . . . be withheld from the public for 
30 days after its submission to the Council. It was widely agreed that there is 
“no need” for the requirement, that “it should be eliminated,” that it is 
impractical, and that it does not stand up to serious analysis, and that, in 
general, it seriously undermines the purpose of the articles 14 and 15 
process.272 
 
 267 TRAC, supra note 29, at 45. 
 268 ISSUES RELATED, supra note 29, at 19. A similar complaint is that “[t]he Council’s 
resolutions appear to require submitters to allege specific violations in order to support the 
development of a factual record.” Id. at 19 
 269 Comm’n for Envtl. Cooperation, supra note 218, at 2. 
 270 See, e.g., NAAEC, supra note 28, art. 1(h) (identifying transparency as one of the goals); 
Yang, supra note 169, at 444 (indicating that transparency is the “major goal” of the process). 
The Council itself frequently touts its commitment to transparency and the importance the 
NAAEC gives to transparency as an objective. See, e.g., Council Res. 99-06, C.E.C. Doc. C/99-
00/07/Rev.3 (June 28, 1999), http://www.cec.org/files/PDF/COUNCIL/99-06e_EN.pdf (last visited 
July 14, 2006) (noting the importance of transparency and fairness in the citizen submissions 
process); Council Res. 00-09, C.E.C. Doc. C/00-00/RES/09/Rev.2 (June 13, 2000), 
http://www.cec.org/files/PDF/COUNCIL/00-09e_EN.pdf (last visited July 14, 2006) (similarly 
recognizing the importance of transparency in the citizen submissions process). 
 271 See generally Council, Council's View on Council Resolution 00-09, 3 (Nov. 2004), 
http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/COUNCIL/Council-Report-00-09_en.pdf (last visited July 15, 2006) 
(opining on the change to section 10.2 of the Guidelines for Submissions on Enforcement 
Matters under articles 14 and 15 of the NAAEC that previously directed the Secretariat to notify 
the public that the Secretariat had made a recommendation 30 days after the Secretariat 
submitted the recommendation); Guidelines for Submissions, supra note 72, at 10.2 (directing 
the Secretariat to notify the public that the Secretariat had made a recommendation 30 days 
after the Secretariat submitted the recommendation). 
 272 LESSONS LEARNED, supra note 29, at 10. JPAC itself formally recommended that the 
“current 30-day ‘blackout’ period should either be abolished or substantially reduced.” Id. at 16; 
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It was only after citizen complaints about this directive that the Council 
revised it to allow the Secretariat to make its recommendations available to 
the public (in addition to providing them to the Council) in a more timely 
manner.273 
Also on the issue of confidentiality, in Lessons Learned JPAC reported 
that “[s]everal commentators expressed concern regarding what they 
perceived as an increase in parties’ reliance on the confidentiality provisions 
of [the NAAEC].”274 JPAC itself expressed the view that: 
[A] Party’s right to invoke that [the confidential information] defense against 
disclosure should be narrowly construed and should be limited to those 
circumstances in which it is expressly authorized by [the NAAEC]. . . . Anything 
broader than that . . . will serve principally to dilute the effectiveness of a 
procedure that relies on public disclosure and scrutiny for its credibility and 
acceptance. If a Party invokes the privacy defense, it should state the reasons 
and the provisions it relies on.275 
Chris Wold, the attorney whose submission led to the only factual 
record concerning U.S. enforcement practices, shares many of the critiques 
of the Council examined above.  He notes: 
[E]arly support [for the process] . . . has waned considerably as the decisions of 
the CEC’s Council . . . have eroded public confidence in the process. The 
Council has marginalized the Secretariat’s independence by narrowing the 
scope of submissions, a role designated to the Secretariat. In addition, it has 
ignored the JPAC’s advice on implementation of the submission process. 
Moreover, the member governments have chosen to treat the Citizen 
Submission process as adversarial, rather than cooperative. . . . 
. . . . 
The Council . . . [has] seriously inhibited the Citizen Submission Process from 
achieving more positive environmental results and deeply undermined the 
Secretariat and the JPAC. Consequently, support for the Citizen Submission 
Process in the United States is very low.276 
Wold concludes: 
Environmental groups who have supported the development and 
implementation of the Citizen Submission Process are growing increasingly 
frustrated over the Council’s unwillingness to respect the boundaries 
established in the process. If this perception continues, many of the groups 
who have supported and defended the Citizen Submission Process may simply 
abandon the process and declare it, and the CEC, inappropriately tailored to 
meet the challenges of environmental enforcement. 
 
see also JPAC Workshop, supra note 171, at 4 (suggesting that the 30 day delay is “nonsensical, 
impractical and does not stand up to serious analysis”). 
 273 Council Res. 01-06, supra note 181 at 1–2. 
 274 LESSONS LEARNED, supra note 29, at 11. 
 275 Id. at 17; see also Yang, supra note 169, at 454, 475–76. 
 276 Wold, supra note 58, at 417–18. The Council has responded to some of these criticisms. 
See, e.g., Montoro, supra note 260. 
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The Council certainly knows what it must do to restore public confidence in 
the process and to ensure its effectiveness. It must release its grip on the 
process and embrace the NAAEC’s cooperative spirit. The question is whether 
it has the political will to do so.277 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Strong interest exists today in increasing citizen participation in 
governance to bolster government legitimacy. There may be a number of 
reasons why a mechanism of governance intended to facilitate or encourage 
such participation is or is not effective in doing so. Success or failure may be 
due to factors largely extrinsic to the mechanism or process itself, such as 
the low priority that prospective citizen participants give to the issues the 
process addresses, limited citizen resources, or the availability of alternative 
processes. Similarly, the outcomes available through a process may limit 
citizen interest in participating in it. People’s “preferences for the processes 
by which . . . policy decisions are made” may be relevant as well.278 
This Article suggests that the psychology literature on procedural 
justice offers one framework for thinking about the design of institutions to 
encourage citizen involvement. This literature seeks to advance 
understanding of the types of process features that are likely to yield high 
levels of participant satisfaction, and the types of features that are not. This 
Article applies this literature in the context of a particular governance 
mechanism that is intended to encourage meaningful citizen involvement 
and, indeed, depends on it, the CEC citizen submissions process, in order to 
explore why early citizen enthusiasm for the process may have turned into 
citizen disaffection, at least with respect to use of the process to challenge 
U.S. enforcement policies and practices. Using the terminology from the 
psychology literature, it appear that citizen concerns about neutrality and 
trust, in particular, may be affecting citizen confidence in the process and 
their interest in using it.279 
Systematic, empirical work is a logical next step to test the sense of the 
commentary that this Article offers. In the context of the CEC process, 
empirical work would be helpful, for example, to confirm (or not) the 
sentiments expressed in the commentary concerning possible reasons why 
 
 277 Wold, supra note 58, at 443–44. Randy Christensen, a principal Canadian submitter, 
echoes Mr. Wold’s concerns: “The repeated attempts by Council to influence the handling of 
specific submissions have not only impeded the operation of the spotlight, but have also 
undermined public confidence in the process.” Christensen, supra note 59, at 184–85. But he 
continues: “Despite these deficiencies, it is likely that the environmental groups will continue to 
use the mechanism in attempts to deal with non-enforcement issues within Canada, as there are 
few domestic alternatives.” Id. 
 278 WHAT IS IT ABOUT GOVERNMENT, supra note 18, at 4. Of course, because of other 
considerations, it may be that “[citizen] disapprobation of the current system [is] preferable to 
the style of government that would make the people happy.” Id. at 1. Further, other factors 
besides the process design issues discussed in the procedural justice literature may affect 
citizen satisfaction. 
 279 See supra Part III (discussing these terms). 
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citizen satisfaction with the process appears to be limited and to have 
declined in recent years, at least with regard to submissions involving the 
United States. Related, there would seem to be considerable potential value 
in exploring systematically why submissions concerning Mexico and Canada 
have not experienced similar declines. Future empirical work concerning 
the CEC citizen submission mechanism might focus on at least three 
questions that in particular seem well worth exploring: 1) what features of 
the process are of greatest importance or salience to citizens from a 
procedural justice perspective; 2) what is the relative importance of 
procedural justice vis-á-vis distributive justice concerns; and 3) how relevant 
are extrinsic factors (such as culture, the availability of alternative 
mechanisms, etc.) to citizens’ interest in using the process. 
Beyond the specific context of the CEC citizen submission process, this 
Article suggests the possible value of multi-faceted analyses of institutions 
of governance that are intended to promote citizen participation, and the 
potential value of the procedural justice literature as one tool in undertaking 
such analyses. Systematic work on citizen satisfaction obviously will be 
helpful in developing more informed and sophisticated understandings 
generally of the features of decision making processes that citizens value.280 
As this work yields greater understanding, it will be up to policy makers and 
others to use this knowledge to revisit mechanisms that already exist and to 
design new mechanisms of governance.281 
 
 280 Gibson, supra note 7, at 538, 555 (noting that “we have a long way to go in understanding 
the relationship between institutional performance and legitimacy” and that “only with more 
valid measures of institutional legitimacy can we make progress in unraveling the causal 
linkages between performance and legitimacy”). 
 281 For one such observation, see, e.g., Christensen, supra note 59, at 180–81 (suggesting that 
formally constituted advisory groups may serve as an effective counterweight to reduce 
possible government interference). What was not foreseen was the level of success that groups 
and advisory groups (such as the JPAC) would have in resisting Council attempts to manipulate 
and “reform” the process. The participation of the formal advisory groups have been central to 
maintaining the integrity of the citizen submission process. In each case where Council 
attempts have been rebuffed, the advisory groups have issued formal “advice” or 
communications to the Council. 
Christensen suggests that “the environmental side agreement’s strong environmental 
mandate and formal public advisory bodies have proven surprisingly effective counterbalances 
to Council abuses. With sufficient reform, the mechanism could provide a model for addressing 
environmental concerns in future trade agreements.” Id. at 165. 
